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JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT
This Appeal is from an order denying Appellant Michael Landes'
Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike and Granting
Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and a subsequent
Judgment, which pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, was determined by the district court to be final and
from which an appeal may be taken to the Utah Supreme Court as a
matter of right.

Article VIII, Section 9, Utah Constitution and

Section 78-2-2(3) (j), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Whether or not the district court erred in granting

Respondent $75,000 as damages for past rental fees when the lessee
abandoned the premises and the district court concluded that
Respondent had not used its best efforts to relet the premises and
therefore had failed to mitigate its damages.
2. Whether or not the district court erred in its conclusion
that Respondent was entitled to $15,000 as damages to restore the
premises when no evidence was presented at trial concerning the
cost of restoring the premises to its pre-lease condition.
3. Whether or not the district court erred as a matter of law
in awarding Respondent its attorney's fees when no contract between
the Respondent and Appellant nor any applicable statutory provision
provided for such an award.

ACY/ms
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4. Whether or not the district court erred as a matter of law
in concluding that rejection of the lease under the applicable
provisions of the United States Bankruptcy Code did not terminate
the

lease

or

affect

the

obligation

of

the

non-bankruptcy

guarantors.
5. Whether or not the district court erred as a matter of law
in ruling that entry of a judgment on a separate claim precludes
a

Defendant

from asserting defenses

in a subsequent

lawsuit

involving a different claim because of the application of the
doctrine of res judicata.
6« Whether or not the district court erred as a matter of law
in ruling that entry of a judgment in a prior action precludes a
Defendant from asserting defenses that were not raised or fully and
fairly adjudicated in the prior case because of the application of
the doctrine of collateral estoppel,
7. Whether or not the district court erred as a matter of law
in concluding that satisfaction of a judgment which did not
adjudicate all the claims against all parties in the action
rendered that judgment final for purposes of the application of the
documents of res judicata and collateral estoppel,
8. Whether or not the district court erred as a matter of law
in concluding that by involuntarily satisfying a judgment which did
not adjudicate all the claims against all parties in an action the
Judgment Debtor gave up his right to appeal that judgment.
9. Whether or not the district court erred as a matter of law
in ruling that Defendant was a guarantor of the obligation of Bagel
ACY/ms
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Nosh Holding Corp. when the only writing presented as evidence of
such a relationship contained express conditions precedent which
had not been fulfilled.
10.

Whether or not the district court erred as a matter of

law in ruling that Appellant owed Respondent for lease payments
under the First Amended Lease after Respondent had terminated the
lease by serving a notice to pay rent or quit pursuant to the Utah
unlawful detainer statute.
11.

Whether or not the district court erred in considering

a hearsay affidavit filed by Respondent following the trial which
addressed a material issue raised at trial.
12.

Whether or not the district court erred as a matter of

law in denying Appellant's Motion to Strike uncertified Exhibits
submitted in support of Respondent's Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
Section 78-36-1 et. seq. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
See Addendum.
11 USC Section 365(d)(4).

See Addendum.

STATEMENT OF CASE
Respondent initiated the present civil proceeding against
Appellant to enforce an alleged guaranty contract entered into
between the parties relating to a commercial lease.

The present

action was filed by Respondent against Appellant and a co-guarantor

ACY/ms
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on November 18, 1985.

The parties brought cross motions for

summary judgment before the district court.
granted

Respondent

application of

partial

the doctrines

summary

The district court

judgment

of collateral

based

estoppel

on

the

and res

judicata o A trial of the remaining issues was held on December 9,
and 10, 1988.

Following the trial, on May 26, 1989, the district

court entered a final judgment against Appellant for the total sum
of $134,649.51.

That award consisted of $75,000 for past due

rental fees, $15,000 for renovation expenses, and $44,639.51 for
interest, costs and attorney's fees.

STATEMENT OP FACTS

1.

Under

a

Lease

Agreement

dated

December

29,

1978

(hereinafter referred to as "Lease"), Respondent leased to Bagel
Nosh Holding Corp., (hereinafter referred to as "Lessee"), certain
real property located in Olympus Hills Mall, Salt Lake City, Utah.
(Exhibit 2-P)
2. On July 15, 1981, Respondent, Lessee, Appellant and Sidney
Seftel executed a document entitled First Amendment to Lease which
provided that upon the occurrence of four express conditions the
prior default of Lessee under the Lease would be cured and the
lease agreement as amended by the First Amendment to Lease would
be in full force.
3.

(Exhibit 3-P)

Specifically, paragraph 9 of the document entitled First

Amendment to Lease provided that the default of Lessee would be
ACY/ms
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cured and the Amended Lease would be in full force and affect - "as
of the date of the last to occur" - of the following events:

(1)

pay to the owner the sum of $7,500.00 in cash; (2) execute the
First Amended Lease Agreement; (3) cause to be signed by Seftel and
Landes a Guarantee of Lease attached to the Amended Lease as
Exhibit "C"; and (4) sign and deliver to owner a promissory note
in the principal sum of $11,000.00.

(Exhibit 3-P). The third of

these conditions precedent to the effectiveness of the Amended
Lease, to wit, the execution by Seftel and Appellant of the
Guarantee of Lease has never occurred.
4.

(Rec. p. 725).

On July 10, 1984, Respondent caused to be served upon

Lessee a three day notice to pay rent or vacate.
596).

(Rec. pgs. 595-

Said notice was served upon Lessee in accordance with the

requirements of Utah's unlawful detainer statute, Section 78-36-1,
et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.

By failing to pay

the past due amount or vacate the premises, Lessee was in unlawful
detainer of the premises following July 14, 1984.

(Rec. pgs. 672-

673).
5.

On July 23, 1984, Respondent

filed a complaint for

unlawful detainer against Lessee, Appellant and Sidney Seftel in
the Third District Court for the State of Utah under Civil No.
C84-4355.

(Rec. pgs. 576-580).

By said complaint, Respondent

sought possession of the leased premises, damages for past due rent
and treble damages as provided by the Utah unlawful detainer
statute.
6.
ACY/ms

(Rec. pgs. 579-580).
Following the filing of its unlawful detainer complaint
5

in Civil No. C84-4355, the Respondent filed a possession bond and
gave notice to defendants pursuant to Section 78-36-8.5, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended.

(Rec. pgs. 672-673).

Following a

hearing on the issue of possession the Honorable Homer Wilkinson
entered an order on November 9, 1984, requiring defendants restore
Respondent

to possession of the premises or

file a $20,000

counterbond on or before 5:00 p.m., Friday, November 9, 1984.
(Rec. pgs. 672-673).

The order went on to state that if the

counterbond was not filed a Writ of Restitution would immediately
issue and the defendants were required to vacate the premises
before November 14, 1984. (Rec. pgs. 672-673). No counterbond was
obtained or filed by defendants.
7.

On November 8, 1984, Bagel Nosh Intermountain Ltd.,

(hereinafter Debtor) filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code.

(Rec. pgs. 134-136).

Following

that filing, counsel for defendants withdrew from Civil No. C844355e

On December 31, 1984, Respondent entered into a stipulation

with the Debtor regarding payment of past due and ongoing rents and
the assumption or rejection of the lease.

(Exhibit K-D).

The

lease was subsequently rejected by the Debtor and operation of the
United State Bankruptcy Code.

(Rec. pgs. 134-136; and 138).

8. On December 20, 1984, Civil No. C84-4355 came on for trial
before the Honorable Homer Wilkinson.

(Rec. p. 351). Respondent

was present at trial and represented by counsel.

Defendants were

neither present nor represented by counsel at said trial.
p. 351) .
ACY/ms
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only against the individual defendants.

(Rec. p. 351).

In the

absence of the defendants or their counsel, the district court
entered judgment against the individual defendants and in favor of
Respondent

for damages

in the amount of past due rents and

associated costs and attorney's fees.

(Rec. pgs. 353-354).

In

addition, the trial court found that Sidney Seftel and Appellant
had agreed to personally guaranty performance and payment by the
tenant under the terms of the First Amendment Lease and concluded
that reduction to judgment of the past due, unpaid sums did not
terminate that lease.

(Rec. pgs. 353-354).

Civil No. C84-4355

remains an open case in the Third District Court for the State of
Utah.
9.

Following entry of judgment against Appellant in Civil

No. C84-4355, Respondent undertook extensive collection activities.
In response to and as a result of those collection activities, the
parties
judgment

entered

into a stipulation

amount

which

was

stipulation with the Debtor.

not

regarding

covered

by

payment
the

(Rec. pgs. 185-188).

of the

Respondent's
On October 31,

1985, counsel for Respondent filed a Satisfaction of Judgment in
the Third District Court in Civil No. C84-4355.
10.

On November 18, 1985, Respondent filed the instant suit

against Appellant for rental fees and costs which had accrued
against Debtor, under the First Amended Lease during the pendency
of the bankruptcy.

(Rec. pgs. 2-52). In its complaint, Respondent

alleged that Appellant was estopped from denying his liability as
guarantor by application of the doctrines of collateral estoppel
ACY/ms
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and res judicata.
11.

On September 8, 1988, Appellant filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment.
that

(Rec. p. 4 ) .

summary

(Rec. pgs. 366-367).

judgment

dismissing

In that motion, he argued

Respondent's

complaint

was

appropriate because of the existence of several, dispositive
defenses to liability that were not barred by the application of
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Respondent
filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment based on its position
that

Appellant

could

not

contest

application of those doctrines.
12.

liability

because

of

the

(Res. pgs. 120-121).

On January 20, 1989, the district court entered its

Memorandum Decision.

(Rec. pgs. 685-688).

The district court

reasoned that satisfaction of the prior judgment rendered it final
for purposes of res judicata and collateral estoppel and that by
satisfying the judgment Appellant gave up his right to appeal. The
district court concluded that satisfaction of the judgment in the
prior action precluded Appellant

from asserting any defenses

relating to his liability as a guarantor or the validity of the
lease because those defenses were barred by the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel. Previously on November 14, 1988,
the district court had entered an order denying Appellant's motions
and granting Respondent partial summary judgment.

(Rec. pgs. 645-

646).
13.

On February 9 and 10, 1989, a trial was held on the

remaining issues.

(Rec. p. 629). On March 31, 1989, the district

court entered its Memorandum Decision (Rec. pgs. 724-729) and on
ACY/ms
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May 26, 1989 entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Judgment in which it granted Respondent a judgment in the total
amount of $134,639.51 against Appellant.

(Rec. pgs. 749-754).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Argument One:

The district court concluded that Respondent

did not use its best efforts to relet the premises and thereby
failed to mitigate its damages.

Under the standard found in Reid

v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company, 110 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah
1989), Respondent's failure to mitigate forecloses any award of
damages against Appellant for past due rents.
Argument Two: The contract of guaranty which formed the basis
of Appellant's liability contained no provision for an award of
attorney's fees.

The Lease did not expressly grant Respondent a

right to attorney's fees in an action brought against a guarantor.
Therefore

the

district

court's

award

of

attorney's

fees to

Respondent constitutes reversible error.
Argument Three: There was no basis in the evidence presented
at trial for the district court's award of $15,000 as damages for
Appellant's failure to restore the leasehold premises to its prelease condition.
Argument Four:

The provisions of Section 365(d)(4) of the

United States Bankruptcy Code resulted in the automatic rejection
and termination of the Lease.

Damages resulting from termination

are expressly defined in the Lease and the evidence presented at
ACY/ms
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trial established that Respondent suffered no damages as a result
of the termination.
Argument Five:

Because the claim presented in this action

differs from that presented in the prior case, the doctrine of res
•judicata should not have been applied to bar Appellant from
presenting his defenses to the Respondent's claims.
Argument Six: The issues of fact which were litigated in the
prior case and those presented in this case differ.

Because of

the absence of the defendants or their counsel and Respondent's
amendments of its cause of action at the prior trial, the original
case was not fully, fairly and competently litigated.
the district
Appellant

court's reliance on collateral

Therefore,

estoppel

to bar

from presenting any defenses constitutes reversible

error.
Argument Seven:

Because the prior adjudication did not

adjudicate the Respondent's claims against a bankrupt defendant,
the judgment entered therein was not final and could not form the
basis for applying the doctrines of res judicata or collateral
estoppel.
Argument Eight:

The district court ruled that satisfaction

of the prior judgment rendered it final and therefore formed the
basis for application of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The
Utah Supreme Court has previously held that a judgment must be
final and appealable before those doctrines can be imposed.
Argument Nine: The First Amendment to Lease allegedly formed
the basis of Appellant's liability as a guarantor.
ACY/ms
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That contract

contained four express conditions precedent to its enforceability•
One of those conditions, to wit, the execution of a separate
guaranty agreement was never fulfilled•

Therefore, the first

amendment to lease was not enforceable.
Argument Ten: The Respondent terminated the lease in question
by serving a notice to quit or pay rent on the Lessee pursuant to
the Utah unlawful detainer statute. This termination of the lease
relieved

Appellant

from

any continuing

liability

for rental

payments.
Argument Eleven:

The involuntary satisfaction of the prior

judgment did not result in a waiver of Appellant's right to appeal
that j udgment.
Argument Twelve:

Following the trial and the close of

Respondent's case, counsel for Respondent filed a hearsay affidavit
in which another member of the Utah State Bar explained what a
local Bankruptcy Judge allegedly told him regarding a critical
legal

issue

in

this

case.

The

district

court

erroneously

considered this prejudicial affidavit in reaching its decision.
Argument Thirteen:

Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment was not supported by affidavit but by uncertified copies
of certain documents.

The district court erroneously denied

Appellant's Motion to Strike those exhibits and considered them in
granting Respondent's motion.

ACY/ms
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ARGUMENT ONE
THE RESPONDENT'S FAILURE TO MITIGATE RENDERS THE
DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES REVERSIBLE ERROR
In Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company, 110 Utah Adv.
Rep 12 (Utah 1989), this Court imposed a duty upon landlords to
mitigate their damages by reletting the premises after a tenant
vacates or defaults on the covenant to pay rent.

In Reid this

Court held:
"[T]hat a Landlord who seeks to hold a breaching tenant
liable for unpaid rents has an obligation to take commercially
reasonable steps to mitigate its losses, which ordinarily
means that the Landlord must seek to relet the premises." Id.
110 Utah Ad. Rep. 17.
This Court went on to explain that under this standard of
objective, commercial reasonableness, a landlord has the burden of
proving the fact that it took positive steps reasonably calculated
to effect a reletting of the premises.

Ld. 110 Utah Ad. Rep 17.

At the trial of the present case, Appellant argued that
Respondent had failed to fulfill its duty of mitigation and
therefore was foreclosed from receiving an award of damages for
past due rents. Although the Reid decision had not been released
at the time of trial, Appellant based this mitigation defense on
the

statutory

provisions

of

Annotated, (1953), as amended.

Section

78-36-12.6,

Utah

Code

At trial, Appellant argued that

because the lessee had abandoned the premises, Section 78-36-12.6
imposed an affirmative obligation upon the landlord to mitigate by
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reletting.1
Based upon the undisputed evidence presented at trial, the
district court concluded that the Respondent did not use its best
efforts to relet the premises.

(Rec. p. 727). This conclusion was

based in part on the testimony of David Pugh who was the property
manager for Olympus Hills Mall.

Mr. Pugh testified that as many

as thirty (30) potential tenants were interested in leasing the
space in question following the Lessee's abandonment.

(Trans, p.

142). In addition, Mr. Pugh testified that the premises could have
been leased within three months of October, 1985. (Trans, p. 147).
These potential tenants were refused by the Respondent because
it made a subjective determination that it would only relet the
premises to a certain kind of tenant.

(Trans, p. 119). As Mr.

Pugh explained, the Respondent informed the property manager that
it would only rent the premises to prime tenants that were strong
financial operations and had recognized names.

(Trans, p. 141).

The testimony before the district court and the record on
appeal

establishes

conclusively

that

the

Respondent

made

a

subjective decision to leave the property idle when it could have
been leased. Under Reid, such a subjective decision is a violation
of a landlord's duty to mitigate.

Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins.

Co., 110 Utah Adv. Rep. p. 16.
At trial, the Respondent failed to prove that it fulfilled its

x

The act of abandonment is clearly establishes by the record
in this case.
The trial court found a paragraph 12 of its
memorandum decision that the exact date that Bagel Nosh vacated the
premises is unknown. (Rec. p. 726).
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obligation of mitigation.

In fact, the district court concluded

as a matter of law that the Respondent failed to use its best
efforts to relet the premises.

That conclusion and this Court's

decision in Reid are dispositive of the present appeal.
Therefore, the district court's award of $75,000.00 for past
due rents constitutes reversible error and requires that the
judgment below be reversed.
ARGUMENT TWO
THE DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR
From prior decisions a set of clearly defined rules regarding
the award of attorney's fees has emerged. The first of these rules
is that attorney's fees may not be recovered unless expressly
provided for by contract or statute.

Jenkins v. Bailey, 676 P.2d

391, 392 (utah 1984); Mecham v. Benson, 590 P.2d 304 (Utah 1979);
Walker v. Sandwick, 548 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1976); Holland v. Brown,
394 P.2d 77 (Utah 1964).

Secondly, any award of attorney's fees

must be based on the express terms of the contract between the
parties. See Cluff v. Culmer, 556 P.2d 498 (Utah 1976).

See also,

Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, 645 P.2d 667, 671
(Utah 1982).
In the present case, Respondent sought an award of attorney's
fees against Appellant based on Section 29.06 of the Lease. At no
time did Respondent allege or introduce any evidence to prove that
Appellant was a party to the Lease. Rather, Respondent argued that
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by execution of the First Amendment to Lease, Appellant enter into
a contract of guaranty whereby he became a personal guarantor of
the terms of the First Amended Lease. The First Amendment to Lease
had no express provision regarding attorney's fees.2

(Exhibit 3-

Rather than relying on the actual contract which formed the
basis

of

Appellant's

liability,

the

district

court

granted

Respondent attorney's fees based on the provisions of the separate
lease agreement.3

This award constitutes reversible error for two

reasons. In the first place, Appellant is not a party to the Lease
and has no liability thereunder.

Secondly, the express terms of

the Lease do not provide for an award of attorney's fees in the
present case.
The lease originally provided for an award of attorney's fees
in Sections 24.03 and 29.06.

Section 24.03 was deleted from the

lease by being marked through. Therefore, any grant of attorney's

2

While the Utah Supreme Court has granted an award of
attorney's fees in a case involving a personal guarantee, the award
was based on an express provision for payment of such fees
contained in the guaranty agreement. North Park Bank of Commerce
v. Nichols, 645 P.2d 620, 622 (Utah 1982).
3

It must be noted that the First Amendment to Lease stated
that the terms of Appellant's personal guaranty would be spelled
out in a separate Guarantee of Lease which was to be attached to
the Lease as Exhibit "C". The Respondent failed to introduce this
Guarantee of Lease at the trial. (Rec. p. 725) Because Respondent
failed to introduce the document which defined the contract between
the parties any award of attorney's fees for enforcement of that
contract of guaranty constitutes reversible error.
ACY/ms

15

fees under the lease must be based on Section 29.06.4
Under the express terms of Section 29.06, the only time that
attorney's fees could be awarded is when the Respondent initiates
an action against the tenant. Appellant is not the tenant and has
no liability under that Section. Therefore any award of attorney's
fees to Respondent constitutes reversible error.
ARGUMENT THREE
NO EVIDENTIARY BASIS EXISTS FOR THE DISTRICT COURT'S
AWARD OF $15,000 IN RESTORATION EXPENSES
At the trial, Respondent sought an award of $165,000 from
Appellant for the purpose of remodeling the premises.

Respondent

argued that this amount was necessary to create a "vanilla finish"
to the premises which would assist the Landlord in attracting a
national tenant.

(Transcript p. 10).

In contradiction to Respondent's position, Appellant argued
that the terms of the Lease required the Lessee to merely restore
the premises to its condition before the Lessee took possession.
Respondent disagreed with Appellant's interpretation of the lease
provisions and presented evidence of its estimate of the cost of
producing a "vanilla finish" at the premises. (Transcript p. 129).

4

Section 29.06 states: "In the event that any time during the
term of this lease either the Owner or the Tenant shall institute
any action or proceeding against the other relating to the
provisions of this lease, or any default hereunder, then, and in
that event, the unsuccessful party in such action or proceeding
agrees to reimburse the successful party for the reasonable
expenses of such action including reasonable attorney's fees and
disbursements incurred therein by the successful party."
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At no time during the trial, did the Respondent present any
evidence of what the condition of the premises was before the
Lessee took possession or what the cost would be to restore the
premises to that condition.

(Transcript p. 133; pgs. 93-94).

Respondent's only evidence went to the cost of the so called
"vanilla finish".
In its Memorandum Decision, the district court agreed with
Appellant's interpretation of the Lease as it regards restoration
of the premises and refused to award Respondent its requested cost
of remodeling the leasehold.

However, without any evidentiary

basis , the district court assessed damages against Appellant in the
amount of $15,000 as the cost of restoring the premises to its prelease condition. This award is totally unsupported by any evidence
and must be reversed.
It is axiomatic that the plaintiff must prove the amount of
damages.

See Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel., 709

P.2d 330 (Utah 1985).

As this Court explained in Sawyer v. FMA

Leasing Co. , 722 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1986), the fact of damages
must be proven with reasonable certainty and the amount by a
reasonable though not necessarily precise estimate.
In the present case, the Respondent called Roger P. Knight to
testify as to the cost of remodeling the premises.

Upon cross

examination, Mr. Knight admitted that he did not know the condition
of the leasehold before the Lessee took possession and could not
testify as to the cost of restoring the premises to that condition.
(Transcript p. 133). Similarly, the Respondent's general manager,
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Mr. Richard Skankey, testified that he could not state what it
would cost to restore the premises to their pre-lease condition.
(Transcript p. 94).
No testimony or other admissible evidence was introduced by
Respondent at the trial on this measure of damages.

Therefore,

there is no evidentiary basis for the district court's award of
$15,000 against Appellant and that portion of the judgment must be
reversed.
ARGUMENT FOUR
THE LEASE IN QUESTION WAS TERMINATED
BY ITS AUTOMATIC REJECTION UNDER THE
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY CODE
In support of his motion for Summary Judgment and at the trial
of this case, Appellant argued that the bankruptcy of the Lessee
resulted in the rejection of the Lease, if the Lease was not
terminated by Respondent's prior notice to quit. Appellant further
argued that according to the majority of courts that have analyzed
that issue, the rejection resulted in termination of the lease and
required the district court restrict Respondent's damages to those
provided by Section 24.02 of the Lease.5
5

Section 24.02 of the Lease (Exhibit 2-P) provides in
pertinent part: "No such re-entry or taking possession of said
premises by owner shall be construed as an election on its part to
terminate this lease unless a written notice of such intention be
given or unless the termination thereof be decreed by a court of
competent jurisdiction. . . . Should owner at any time terminate
this lease for any breach, in addition to any other remedies it may
have, it may recover from Tenant all damages it may incur by reason
of such breach, including the cost of recovering the leased
premises, reasonable attorneys' fees, and including the worth at
the time of such termination of the excess if any, of the amount
of rent and charges equivalent to rent reserved in this lease for
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The majority of time spent in the two day trial of this case
related to this termination defense.

In its Memorandum Decision,

the district court rejected Appellant's position and concluded as
a matter of law that the bankruptcy proceeding of Debtor did not
result in the termination of the lease.

(Rec. p. 727).

This

erroneous legal conclusion constitutes reversible error.
On November 3, 1984, Debtor filed for relief under Chapter 11
of the United States Bankruptcy Code.

Section 365(d)(4) of the

United States Bankruptcy Code provides that in a case under any
chapter of that title, if the trustee (or debtor-in-possession)
does not assume or reject an unexpired lease of non-residential
real property under which the debtor is the lessee within 60 days
after the date of the order for relief, then such lease is deemed
rejected, and the trustee shall immediately surrender such nonresidential real property to the lessor.
Assumption of a lease under Section 365 requires formal
approval of the bankruptcy court. While the various federal courts
are split on whether the bankruptcy court's order must be entered
before the 60 days have run, those courts have unanimously agreed
that a motion or other similar expression of a trustee's intent to

the remainder of the stated term over the then reasonable rental
value of the leased premises for the remainder of the stated term,
all of which amounts shall be immediately due and payable from
Tenant to Owner. In determining the rent which would be payable
by tenant hereunder, subsequent to default, the annual rent for
each year of the unexpired term shall be equal to the average
annual minimum and percentage rents paid by Tenant from the
commencement of the term to the time of default, or during the
preceding three (3) full calendar years, whichever period is
shorter.
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assume must be filed with the court within that period.

See In re

By-Rite Distributing, Inc., 55 B.R. 740 (D.C. Utah 1985); See also
In re Treat Fitness Center, Inc., 60 B.R* 878, 880 (9th Cir. BAP
1986).
Similarly, the federal courts have agreed that the trustee or
debtor-in-possession in a Chapter 11 case may not unilaterally
assume a lease and the assumption of a lease can not be effected
solely by conduct.

In re Swiss Hot Dog Co. , 72 B.R. 569, 571, 573

(D. Colo. 1987); In re Chandel Enterprises, Inc., 64 B.R. 607, 609
(Bkrtcy. C D . Cal. 1986).
The certified docketing sheet for the Bagel Nosh bankruptcy
reveals that no order was ever entered by the bankruptcy court for
the

assumption

of

the

lease

in

question.

(Exhibit B-D).

Therefore, the record before the district court established that
the lease had been rejected by operation of the bankruptcy code.
See In re Chandel Enterprises, Inc. , 644 B.R. 607, 610 (Bkrtcy.
CD.

Cal 1986).

Notwithstanding when the rejection occurs, the

fact of rejection relates back to the day before the petition was
filed.

See In re Dixie Fuels, Inc., 52 B.R. 26, 27 (Bkrtcy. N.D.

Ala. 1985); Acme Precision Bldg. v. Dayton Forging, 23 B.R. 79, 84
(Bkrtcy. S.D. Ohio 1982).
Thus, no matter when the rejection took place, upon rejection
the rights of the parties are determined as if the lease was
rejected the day before the petition for bankruptcy was filed.
However, the determination that the lease was rejected marks
the beginning rather than end of the legal question involved in the
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present case.

There is a distinct split of authority in the

federal courts concerning the effect of such a rejection.

Prior

to the amendment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1984, most courts, which
considered
constituted

the

issue,

concluded

that

the

rejection

simply

a pre-petition breach of the lease but did not

terminate the lease.
Following the so-called "shopping center" amendment which was
enacted as part of the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act, the majority of courts now agree that this statutory
rejection terminates the lease. See In re Hawaii Dimensions, Inc.,
47 B.R. 425 (D.C. Hawaii 1985); In re Hurst Lincoln-Mercury, Inc.,
70 B.R. 815 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ohio 1987); In re Southwest Aircraft
Services, Inc. , 53 B.R. 805 (Bkrtcy. C D . Cal. 1985); In re Gillis,
92 B.R. 461 (Bkrtcy. D. Hawaii 1988); In re Mead, 28 B.R. 1000
(D.C. 1983); In re Leonetti, 28 B.R. 1003 (D.C. Pa. 1983).
This majority position is explained in detail in In re Giles
Associates, Ltd., 92 B.R. 695 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Tex. 1988).

(A copy

of that case is included in the appendix hereto) . In Giles, Chief
Judge R. Glen Ayers undertook an exhaustive analysis of the
legislative history of Section 365(d)(4) and its relation to other
sections of the Bankruptcy Code.

Based on that analysis, Chief

Judge Ayers concluded that the express language of the bankruptcy
code and its legislative history clearly shows that, a Section
365(d)(4) rejection was intended by the legislature to effect a
termination of a nonresidential lease.
However, the district court rejected this majority position
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and sided with the minority in concluding that the rejection of the
lease did not result in its termination.

Appellant believes that

this legal conclusion is erroneous and if allowed to stand would
create a questionable precedent.
The conclusion that rejection does not operate to terminate
the lease creates a confusing and unworkable state of affairs. As
the court explained in Giles, Section 364(d)(4) results first in
a rejection of the lease and next in an absolute obligation to
surrender the premises. If the rejection is merely a breach of the
lease,

immediate

surrender

would

not

be

necessary

and

the

landlord's right to possession would be governed by applicable
state law. However, under the amended code, failure to assume the
lease within the statutory, sixty day period results in its
automatic rejection and extinguishes any and all interest of the
debtor in the leasehold.6

See In re Chandel Enterprises. Inc., 64

B.R. 607, 610 (Bkrtcy. C D . Cal. 1986).
Therefore, if the lease is not terminated by the rejection,
an anomalous situation is created in that the debtor has lost all
its interest

in the

leasehold

and must

surrender possession

immediately but would still be obligated to make rental payments
as required by the lease to the landlord.

Obviously this was not

the intent of the legislators.

6

It should be noted that assumption of the lease requires the
debtor to cure all past defaults and provide adequate assurance of
future performance. See 11 USC Section 365(b)(1).
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In addition, the federal courts have defined the measure of
damages that a landlord may claim against a debtor/lessee who has
rejected a nonresidential lease. In such a situation, the landlord
has an administrative claim against the estate for the rental
amount provided under the lease during the 60 day period between
the petition and the automatic rejection and a general unsecured
claim for pre-petition past due rental payments.

See In re TDC

Development Corp., 73 B.R. 135, 137 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Tex. 1987). Once
the lease is rejected, the lease rate no longer controls and the
debtor is only required to pay the reasonable rental value of the
premises while in possession thereof.

In re Chandel Enterprises,

Inc.. 64 B.R. at 610.
Therefore, rejection of the lease determines the landlord's
rights to possession and limits the landlord's right to collect
damages against the debtor/lessee.

However, under the district

court's reasoning, the rejection of the lease, while returning
possession to the landlord would not effect a termination of the
lease. Under that reasoning the debtor/lessee would have no right
to possession or use of the premises for the remainder of the lease
term but would be required to continue to make monthly payments as
provided by the lease.
It appears that the district court, in the present case, may
have been confused by the distinction between the effect of the
rejection of the lease on the debtor/lessee and its effect on the
liability of a guarantor of the lease.

Because the guarantor is

not the debtor in bankruptcy, the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
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do not act directly upon his potential liability.

However,

application of the various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code may
have an indirect affect on the measure of a guarantor's liability.
For example, if Section 365(d)(4) effects a termination of the
lease then the lease is terminated as to both the debtor and its
guarantor and any recovery of damages by the landlord must be based
on the provisions of the lease relating to termination.

In this

case those provisions are found in Section 24.02 of the lease.
Thus, although the Bagel Nosh bankruptcy did not eliminate the
guarantor's liability, the statutory termination of the lease
affects the measure of damages recoverable from Appellant by the
Respondent.
However, at the trial, Respondent's chief witness and managing
partner

testified

that

the

Respondent

did

not

suffer

any

termination damages as that term is defined in the pertinent
portions of Section 24.02.
Specifically, Mr. Richard Skankey testified that the tenant
had been in default on its obligation to pay rent prior to the
rejection of the lease but those amounts had been paid before the
present case was initiated.

(Trans, p. 278). He testified that

Respondent expended no costs to recover possession of the leasehold
premises.

(Trans, p. 80). In addition, he testified that the rent

paid per month for the prior three years was $2,625 per month.
(Trans, p. 281). Previously, he had testified that the fair rental
value of the premises was $3,000.00 per month.
Finally,
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that

(Trans, p. 102).

Respondent

incurred

no

attorney's fees in relation to the reletting of the leasehold
premises.

(Trans. p. 86).

Those elements constitute the measure of damages provided by
the express terms of the lease agreement following termination of
the lease. As the testimony of Mr. Skankey reveals, the Respondent
suffered no damages under that standard.
Therefore the district court's erroneous conclusion of law
that the

lease was not terminated

by the rejection greatly

prejudiced Appellant and constitutes reversible error.
ARGUMENT FIVE
THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
APPLIED UNDER THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE
The Utah Supreme Court has previously

held that, while

related, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are
usually mutually exclusive.

Schaer v. State By & Through Utah

Dept., 657 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Utah 1983).

In Schaer, Justice Durham

explained that where the claim, demand, or cause of action is the
same in both cases, res judicata applies, but where the claim,
demand

or cause of

action

is different

collateral estoppel is applicable.
In

the

first

action

between

in the cases, then

Id.. p. 1340.
the

present

parties, the

Respondent sought possession of the premises, past due rental fees
incurred prior to July 14, 1984, and statutory treble damages. The
first action was brought under the Utah unlawful detainer statute,
Section 78-36-1, et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
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In the case presently before this Court, the Respondent did
not name the tenant as a defendant, and did not initiate the action
under the unlawful detainer statute.

Instead, the Respondent

simply sought past due and accruing rental fees from the Appellant
and an alleged co-guarantor.

The period of time involved in the

present case was distinct and different from the period in which
rental fees were sought in the prior action.
Other courts have held that separate causes of action exist
for rental or lease fees that accrue at different time.

See

Rasmussen v. Chase, 720 P.2d 860, 861 (Wash. App. 1986).

In

Mountain States, Etc. v. Salt Lake City, 596 P.2d 649 (Utah 1979),
the Utah Supreme Court held that res judicata has no application
in a suit involving an obligation which has accrued in a period
subsequent to the period at issue in the original litigation.
While the court was concerned with tax obligations in Rasmussen,
the basic principle is equally applicable to obligations accruing
under a commercial lease.
If the claims, demands or causes of action were the same in
the two proceedings, then correct application of the doctrine of
res judicata or claim preclusion would bar the Respondent from
bringing the present action.

See Church v. Meadow Springs Ranch

Corp.. Inc., 659 P.2d 1045, 1048 (Utah 1983).

As Justice Stewart

explained in Church;
The law is that a claim once litigated cannot be relitigated
in a subsequent case between the same parties or their
privies. Id, 1048.
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In the present case, the trial court committed manifest error
in concluding as a matter of law that the claims were different and
allowed Respondent to proceed with the case but invoked the bar
provided by application of res judicata to all of Appellant's
defenses.
If this Court concludes that the two claims are the same and
that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable, following its
decision in Church, it must dismiss the Respondent's cause of
action in its entirety.

If this Court concludes that the claims

are separate and distinct then, based on its decision in Schaer
and the long line of cases following that case, it must hold that
the trial court committed error in applying the doctrine of res
judicata

to

bar

the

litigation

of

Appellant's

defenses

to

liability.
ARGUMENT SIX
THE DOCTRINE OF rOT.T.ATBttAL ESTOPPEL SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN INVOKED BY THE TRIAL COURT TO BAR APPELLANT
FROM PRESENTING ISSUES OF FACT THAT WERE NOT
ACTUALLY LITIGATED IN THE PRIOR ACTION
Collateral

estoppel, or

issue

preclusion,

prevents

the

relitigation of issues that have been once litigated and determined
in another action even though the claims for relief in the two
actions may be different.
P.2d

873, 875

Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669

(Utah 1983).

As Justice Stewart explained in

Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah 1983):
Collateral estoppel is a branch of what was once lumped with
other rules under the general doctrine of res judicata.
Collateral estoppel is distinct from the rules of bar and
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merger - other branches of res judicata - in that it precludes
relitigation only of issues actually tried in a prior action,
and it may be invoked even through the subsequent cause of
action is different from the former.
In further defining the doctrine of collateral estoppel, this
Court has explained that the doctrine does not apply to issues that
merely could have been tried in the prior cause but operates only
on issues of fact which were actually asserted and tried in that
case.

Schaer v. State By & Through Utah Dept., 657 P.2d at 1341.
In direct contradiction to this established rule of law, in

the present case, the trial court ruled that application of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, barred the
Appellant from presenting any and all defenses that he did or could
have raised in the prior action.

Based on this erroneous legal

conclusion, the trial court granted Respondent partial summary
judgment against Appellant on all issues except the amount of
damages.

This overly broad application of collateral estoppel

contradicts established decisions of the Utah Supreme Court and
constitutes manifest error.
In Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978), this
Court set forth the four tests which determine the applicability
of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

Those tests are: (1) was

the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one
presented in the action in question; (2) was there a final judgment
on the merits; (3) was the party against whom the plea is asserted
a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and
(4) was the issue in the first case competently, fully, and fairly
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litigated.

See also Schaer v. State By & Through Utah Dept., 657

P.2d at 1340, 1341.
This four test standard has been affirmed and applied several
times by this Court and the Utah Court of Appeals.

See Baxter v.

Dept. of Transp., 705 P.2d 1167, 1168 (Utah 1985), Trimble Real
Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d 457 (Utah App. 1988), Cooper
State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah App. 1987);
See also Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 635 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah
1981).
In order to impose the bar presented by the doctrine of
collateral estoppel a court must find that each of the four tests
are fulfilled.

As Justice Howe explained in Baxter v. Dept of

Transportation, 705 P.2d at 1168:
If any of these four elements are not satisfied, then summary
judgment based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not
available.
In the present case, the trial court considered and ruled on
only one of the four tests in granting the Respondent partial
summary judgment.

The trial court's failure to properly analyze

the issue also constitutes reversible error.
In addition, application of all four tests to the uncontested
facts of the present case establishes that the trial court's
ultimate conclusion, to wit, that the doctrine should be applied,
was also clearly erroneous.
The present record reveals that the prior action was brought
under the Utah unlawful detainer act.
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In his answer, Appellant,

along with the other defendants, did not present the defenses of
termination of the Lease or the conditional nature of the First
Amendment to Lease.

Following the withdrawal of the defendant's

counsel in that action, the case preceded to trial on the initial
pleadings.

At the time set for trial, neither the Appellant, his

co-defendants, nor their counsel appeared.

Notwithstanding the

absence of the defendants or their counsel, the court allowed the
Plaintiff change his requested relief and call two witnesses and
present limited testimony to the court.7
Following Plaintiff's presentation of some evidence, the trial
court entered judgment against the individual defendant's. Because
a transcript of the proceeding does not exist there is no record
of the substance of the evidence presented by Plaintiff.
Appropriate application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel
requires a court find that the factual issues decided in the prior
adjudication are identical to the ones presented in the subsequent
case.

Under the record in this case there is nothing to support

7

In its complaint in the prior action, Respondent sought
possession of the leased premises.
As additional relief the
complaint sought rental fees which had accrued prior to service of
the statutory notice to quit or pay and treble damages for the
tenant's possession of the premises following service of that
notice. (Exhibit N-D). However, at the time of trial and in the
absence of the defendants or their counsel, the plaintiff changed
its position and requested the trial court rule on the continuing
enforceability of the First Amended Lease and the defendants'
status as guarantors thereof. This drastic change of position was
done without notice to defendants or an opportunity for defendants
to defend against this new cause of action. This alteration in the
plaintiff's position in the prior case and the trial court's grant
of relief which was not prayed for in the complaint constitutes a
violation of fundamental due process.
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the conclusion that the issues of the conditional nature of the
First Amendment to Lease or the termination of the First Amended
Lease were litigated in the prior action. Because those issues of
fact were not addressed in the previous action, the Appellant
should not have been barred from presenting them in this action.
Finally, the fourth test presented in Searle Bros, requires
that the issues be competently, fully and fairly litigated.
this

case, the

prior

adjudication was

a

summary

In

proceeding

undertaken in the absence of the Appellant or his counsel.

This

fact alone should render the doctrine of collateral estoppel
inapplicable because the prior action was not competently, fully,
and fairly litigated.
Under these facts, the factors necessary for the application
of collateral estoppel has not been fulfilled and the trial court's
reliance on that doctrine constitutes reversible error.
ARGUMENT SEVEN
THE PRIOR ADJUDICATION WHICH DID NOT ADJUDICATE ALL THE
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS WAS NOT A
FINAL JUDGMENT AND COULD NOT FORM THE BASIS FOR
APPLICATION OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR RES JUDICATA
This Court has consistently required the existence of a final
judgment before applying the doctrines of collateral estoppel or
res judicata.

Two recent decisions of this Court clearly define

finality for purposes of the application of those doctrines.
In Freegard v. First Western Nat. Bank, 738 P.2d 614 (Utah
1987), the Court was presented with a factual scenario in which
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the trial court had dismissed a complaint because it determined
that a prior judgment between the parties required application of
the doctrine of res judicata.

Reversing the dismissal below, the

Utah Supreme Court relied on the fact that because the prior action
had not adjudicated all the claims against all the defendants it
was not final and thus not appealable. Because the first judgment
was not final under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this
Court

concluded

that

the

doctrine

of

res

judicata

had

no

application and that the dismissal was in error. See also Bernard
v. Attebury, 629 P.2d 892 (Utah 1981).
In Galloway v. Mancrum, 744 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1987), the Utah
Supreme Court faced the issue of finality under a very similar
factual situation.

In Galloway, as in the present case, some of

the original defendants filed for protection under the United
States

Bankruptcy

subsequent

Code while

judgment

against

the

the

action was

remaining

pending.

defendant

did

The
not

adjudicate the plaintiff's claims against the bankrupt defendants.
Notwithstanding the bankruptcies of the other defendants, the
Utah Supreme Court dismissed the remaining defendant's appeal
because under Rule 54(b), the judgment was not final and therefore
not appealable.
Because the prior judgment entered against the Appellant in
this case did not adjudicate the Plaintiff's claims against the
bankrupt defendant, it was not a final judgment and thus not
appealable. The fact that the prior judgment was not final should
have precluded the trial court, in the instant case, from invoking
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the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel.
ARGUMENT EIGHT
SATISFACTION OF THE PRIOR JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE
FORECLOSED APPELLANT FROM PRESENTING DEFENSES TO
LIABILITY UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO LEASE
In granting Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
the

district

satisfaction

court
of

concluded

the

prior

as

a matter

judgment

of

rendered

law
that

that

the

judgment

sufficiently final for application of the doctrines of claim and
issue preclusion.
This Court has repeatedly stated that before a judgment or
order has preclusive effect it must be final.

See Penrod v. Nu

Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d at 875, Schaer v. State By & Through
Utah Dept.. 657 P.2d at 1341.

This Court previously held that a

prior adjudication that did not adjudicate all the claims of all
the parties was not appealable, not final and therefore could not
be used as res judicata in a subsequent action. Freegard v. First
Western National Bank, 738 P.2d 614 (Utah 1987).
No reported decision that Appellant could find, deviated from
this general rule.

Therefore, because the prior action did not

adjudicate all the claims against all the parties it was not final
and should not have been relied upon by the district court to
foreclose Appellant's presentation of defenses not raised in the
prior action.
Outside of Utah, however, some court's have ruled that nonfinal decisions may afford
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doctrine of collateral estoppel.

See Sherman v. Jacobson, 247

F.Supp. 261 (S.D. N.Y. 1965), but See Avondale Shipyards. Inc. v.
Insured Lloyd's, 786 F.2d 1265 (5th Cir. 1986).

This view is

reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Judgmentsr Section 13,
(1982) which states that a judgment may be final for purposes of
issue preclusion if the earlier adjudication was sufficiently firm
to be accorded conclusive effect.
This has led some courts to conclude that a final judgment in
the traditional sense is not essential for the application of issue
preclusion.

See Tausevich v. Bd of Appeals of Stouqhton, 521

N.E.2d 385, 387 (Mass. 1988).

However, the Utah Supreme Court has

never adopted that position and in all its prior decisions has
reiterated the necessity of a final judgment on the merits.

See

e.g* Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d at 692.
Even courts that adopt the Restatement position require the
analysis of certain factors in determining if a non-appealable
order is final for purposes of issue preclusion. Those factors are
generally described as; (1) whether the parties were fully heard
in the prior action in relation to the issue in question; (2) was
the judge's decision supported by a reasoned opinion; and (3) was
the earlier
reviewed.

opinion

subject to appellate review or

in fact

See Tausevich v. Bd of Appeals of Stoughton, 521 N.E.2d

at 387.
In the present case, the district court took none of these
factors

into consideration when

it concluded

that the prior

judgment was sufficiently final to support a complete bar of any
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and all defenses that were or could have been raised in the prior
action.8
Throughout this proceeding, Appellant has sought to adjudicate
two defenses to his alleged liability.
the

termination

of

the

Those defenses consist of

lease by Respondent's

issuance

of a

statutory notice to pay rent or quit and the absence of a condition
precedent to his liability under the First Amendment to Lease.
In relation to issue preclusion or collateral estoppel, the
party relying on the doctrine bears the burden of establishing that
the prior litigation actually determined the question of fact
sought to be precluded.

See Anderson v. Falcon Drilling Co., 695

P.2d 521, 526 (Okl. 1985).

This restriction of claim preclusion

to specific issues of fact that have been previously litigated was
recognized by this Court in Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226
(Utah 1983).

As Justice Stewart explained:

"What is critical (in the application of collateral estoppel)
is whether the issue that was actually litigated in the first
suit was essential to resolution of that suit and is the same
factual issue as that raised in a second suit. Id. 674 P.2d
at 1230.

8

The district court stopped Appellant from presenting his
defenses because of its conclusion that the "finality" of the prior
adjudication was sufficient to invoke the combined doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel.
In combination the district
court concluded that these doctrines barred the adjudication of all
issues and defenses whether actually litigated in the prior action
or not. Thus, rather than analyzing what defenses were raised in
the prior action and what issues of fact were actually litigated
in that case, the district court combined the preclusive effect of
res -judicata with collateral estoppel and ruled that all issues
and defenses whether raised in the other proceeding or not were
barred. This is clearly reversible error.
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Because of its determination that the prior action was final
and its erroneous combination of res judicata and collateral
estoppel. the district court failed to undertake any analysis of
what issues of fact were raised in the prior proceeding.

The

Respondent, who had the burden on that issue failed to present any
admissible evidence to rebut the presumption that the defenses
sought to be raised by Appellant had not been adjudicated before.
Even if this Court reverses the position it has taken in all
previous cases and holds that the entry of a satisfaction of
judgment renders a non-appealable judgment final for purposes of
collateral

estoppel, that doctrine

can not be

applied

as a

comprehensive bar to all defenses whether raised or not in the
prior action.
Additionally, the factors that other courts

have relied upon

in finding that a non-appealable order is final are not present
here.

The parties were not fully heard in the prior action.

In

fact, the Appellant and his co-defendants were not even present at
the trial of that actionc

The judge's decision in the prior action

was not supported by a reasoned opinion and that decision was not
subject to appellate review.
Under these circumstances the district court's determination
that the prior judgment was "final" and that court's convolution
of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel constitute
reversible error.
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ARGUMENT NINE
THE CONDITIONAL NATURE OP THE FIRST AMENDMENT
TO LEASE REQUIRES REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT
It is generally recognized that the law of guaranty is part
of and governed by general contract law. See Moorcroft State Bank
v.

Morel,

701

P.2d

1159

(Wyo.

1985).

Therefore,

proper

interpretation and construction of a guaranty agreement is based
upon the same principles as applied to contracts generally.

See

Bellevue Square Managers v. Granbercr, 469 P.2d 969 (Wash App.
1970); Restatement of Security, Section 88.
In the present case, the trial court found that the First
Amendment to Lease constituted the agreement of guarantee between
Appellant and Respondent.

Paragraph 9 of the First Amendment to

Lease conditions the effective date of Appellant's liability upon
the occurrence of four express conditions.

These conditions

precedent to the liability of the Appellant included the execution
by the two potential guarantors of a Guarantee of Lease Agreement
which was to be attached to the First Amendment to Lease as Exhibit
"C".
Thus, under the clear and unambiguous language of the First
Amendment to Lease, the execution of a separate guaranty agreement
was an express condition precedent to the validity of the Amended
Lease and the guarantors' liability thereunder.

It is clear from

the unambiguous language of the First Amendment to Lease that the
parties did not intend the Appellant to be personally liable as a
guarantor until this Exhibit

M
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C" was executed and the other

conditions were fulfilled.
The Respondent was unable and failed to present an executed
copy of Exhibit "C M , at the trial of this matter or in support of
its motion for partial summary judgment.

(Rec. p. 725). In the

absence of this document, Respondent failed to establish the
fulfillment of an express condition precedent to Appellant's
liability as a guarantor of the First Amended Lease.
ARGUMENT TEN
SERVICE OF STATUTORY NOTICE TO PAY RENT OR VACATE AND
THE LESSEE'S FAILURE TO PAY TERMINATED THE LEASE
On July 10, 1984, Respondent caused a three day notice to pay
rent or vacate to be served upon the Lessee.

(Rec. pgs. 595-596).

The notice was issued in conformity with Utah's unlawful detainer
statute.
Following service of this notice and the tenant's failure to
comply with it, on July 23, 1984, Respondent filed its complaint
for unlawful detainer in the Third District Court.

(Exhibit N-D) .

In that action Respondent sought to regain possession of the
leasehold premises and collect past due rents and damages resulting
from the unlawful detainer of those premises by the tenant.
(Exhibit N-D).
The

statutory

three-day

notice

to

pay

rent

or

vacate

constitutes a written notification of Respondent's termination of
the Amended Lease and the cessation of the tenant's obligation to
make future rental payments pursuant to the terms of that Lease.
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Both the language of the Utah unlawful detainer statute and
the allegations of Respondent's original complaint support this
conclusion. The Utah Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute, Section
78-36-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, provides
at Section 78-36-3(3) that a tenant of real property is guilty of
an unlawful detainer when he continues in possession, in person or
by subtenant, after default in the payment of any rent and after
remaining in possession for a period of three days after service
of a written notice to pay the rent or surrender the premises.
Section 78-36-10 provides the statutory remedies

for such an

unlawful detainer which include an order for the restitution of the
premises, the amount of past rent due and three times the amount
of damages suffered by the landlord from the unlawful detainer by
the tenant.
Respondent's complaint in Civil No. C84-4355 followed this
statutory scheme and contained allegations that the tenant was in
default for failure to pay past due rents and was in unlawful
detainer of the premises by failing to pay the past due amounts or
vacate the premises within 3 days of the written notice to pay rent
or vacate.
Under

(Exhibit N-D).
the

unlawful

detainer

statute,

termination

is

effectuated by the landlord's notice to tenant to pay the past due
rents or vacate and the tenant's failure to cure the default. See
Sovereen v. Meadows. 595 P.2d 852, 854 (Utah 1979).

In Hackford

v. Snow, 657 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1982) this Court explained:
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The basis of a suit in unlawful detainer is unlawful
possession, and a tenant... is not holding unlawfully until
he fails to comply with the demand of notice which has been
properly served on him. (Quoting from Carstensen v. Hansen,
152 P.2d 954 (Utah 1944)).
The Utah Supreme Court went on to explain in Hackford that
when the notice to pay rent or vacate is in compliance with the
requirements of the unlawful detainer act, it terminates the lease
and renders the tenant in unlawful possession if the default is not
cured within the three day period.
at 1276.

See Hackford v. Snow, 657 P.2d

See also Dana v. Cox Corp., 655 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah

1982).
The Utah Supreme Court's reasoning in Hackford follows a long
and established line of cases from this Court recognizing that
service of a notice to pay rent or vacate terminates a lease and
if not complied with renders the tenant in unlawful possession and
subject

to

liability

for treble damages.

Financial Corp. v. Ferrier, 567 P.2d

See eg., Lincoln

1102, 1106

(Utah 1977);

Jacobson v. Swan, 278 P.2d 294, 301 (Utah 1954).
If the lease is not terminated by the notice and failure to
comply therewith, then a tenant would not be in unlawful possession
and an action for unlawful detainer and treble damages could not
be brought.

If the lease was not terminated until an order of

restitution was entered by the trial court, then the tenant could
not be liable for unlawful detainer and treble damages until it
remained in possession after such an order was entered.

Such a

result is clearly contrary to the provisions of the Utah unlawful
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detainer statute and the case law interpreting that statute.

See

Lincoln Financial Corp. v. Ferrier, 567 P.2d 1102 at 1105.
The present case is strikingly similar to the case of In re
Maxwell, 40 B.R. 231 (D.C. 111. 1984).

In Maxwell a sub-tenant

filed for bankruptcy following the initiation of an action by the
lessor under the Illinois unlawful detainer statute.
before the district court

The issues

in Maxwell are identical to those

presented in the present case and the district court's treatment
of those issues is compelling.
In Maxwell, as in the present case, notice was served under
the unlawful detainer statute and an action commenced to evict the
tenant prior to the commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding.

As

in the present case, the state court had not entered judgment when
the bankruptcy was filed and the automatic stay imposed.
In Maxwell the bankruptcy court concluded that in the absence
of a final judgment on the forcible entry and detainer suit, the
sublease had not been terminated. Reversing the bankruptcy court's
conclusion, the district court in Maxwell held that it was clear
under Illinois law that by sending the five-day notice and by
filing a suit for possession the lessor terminated the sublease.
Id, 40 B.R. 236. As the district court explained:
In Illinois the statutory notice procedure for terminating a
lease and a forcible entry and detainer action are two
distinct things. The former process ends the contractual
relationship between the parties while the forcible entry and
detainer action determines rights to possession of property.
Id, 40 B.R. at 237.
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Similarly, in Utah service of the statutory notice and the
tenant's failure to respond thereto terminates the lease and
renders the tenant in unlawful possession of the premises.
dispositive issue was

This

not raised or litigated in the prior action

and Appellant was denied an opportunity to present it in the
present case because of the trial court's erroneous application of
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
ARGUMENT ELEVEN
APPELLANT'S INVOLUNTARY PAYMENT OF A PORTION
OF THE PRIOR JUDGMENT DID NOT REPRESENT AN ACQUIESCENCE
IN THAT JUDGMENT OR MOOT AN APPEAL THEREFROM
In its Memorandum Decision the district court concluded as a
matter of law that the satisfaction of the prior judgment rendered
that judgment final for purposes of res judicata. In addition, the
court concluded that by paying a portion of the prior judgment,
Appellant had waived his right to any appeal of that judgment.
As a general rule, one who acquiesces in a judgment by
transferring property or paying a damage award can not later attack
that judgment on appeal.

See Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612 (Utah

1987). However, this general rule has two exceptions. The general
rule does not necessarily prevent an appeal as to separate and
independent claims if it is shown that a controversy remains in
regard thereto.

See Hollinasworth v. Farmers Ins. Co., 655 P.2d

637, 639 (Utah 1982) .
In addition, the general rule does not apply when the payment
or satisfaction of the judgment was involuntary.
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See Intern.

Business Mach. Corp. v. Lawhorn, 677 P.2d 507 (Idaho App. 1984).
In Lawhorn. the Idaho Court of Appeals held that payment of a
judgment to prevent or avert execution on an appellant's property
was not voluntarily made and therefore refused to invoke the
general rule.
In the present case, the Respondent had initiated extensive
collection efforts against Appellant in both New York and Utah.
Appellant has extensive property holdings in those states.

In an

effort to avert Respondent's inevitable execution on a portion of
his property, Appellant entered into an agreement with Respondent
regarding the payment of the judgment amount which was not paid
under Respondent's stipulation with the Debtor. Appellant entered
into the stipulation with Respondent involuntarily and as a direct
result of Respondent's collection efforts.

The same element of

compulsion is present in this case as existed in Lawhorn.
Because Appellant's involuntary payment of a portion of the
judgment amount was involuntary, the district court's application
of the general rule constitutes reversible error.
ARGUMENT TWELVE
THE DISTRICT COURT'S CONSIDERATION OF
A HEARSAY AFFIDAVIT FILED AFTER THE TRIAL
BY RESPONDENT CONSTITUTES PREJUDICIAL ERROR
Following the close of Respondent's case and more than thirty
days after the conclusion of the trial of this matter, counsel for
Respondent submitted the affidavit of Kris C. Rainey to the
district court for consideration.
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(Rec. p. 701-703).

In that

affidavit, Mr. Rainey, who is a member of the Utah Sate Bar,
recounted a conversation that he had with the Honorable Glen E.
Clark, United States Bankruptcy Judge, during a luncheon meeting.
(Rec. p. 701-702)
In the affidavit, Mr. Rainey explained that upon direct
inquiry Judge Clark stated that rejection of a lease under the
provisions of the United States Bankruptcy Code would not result
in a termination of that lease.
question

of

law was

(Rec. p. 701-702).

a major defense

This precise

to Appellant's

alleged

liability and represented a critical part of the trial process.
Upon being

notified

of

the ex-parte

submission

of this

affidavit, Appellant immediately filed a Motion to Strike and
Impose Sanctions against Respondent.

(Rec. p. 718-720).

Several

days after receiving the affidavit, the district court called
counsel for both parties to chambers and informed counsel that
after

consideration

of

everything

that

had

been

submitted,

including the affidavit of Mr. Rainey, the court would rule that
the rejection of the lease under the Bankruptcy Code did not
terminate the lease.
The district court's receipt and consideration of Mr. Rainey's
heresay affidavit

has extremely prejudicial

to Appellant

and

constitutes reversible error for several reasons.
In the first place, the affidavit contained the heresay
declaration of Judge Clark.

It is universally recognized that

heresay evidence presented by affidavit is inadmissible and may
not be considered by the court.
ACY/ms

See In re Marriage of Morrison,
44

613 P.2d 557, 560 (Wash. App. 1980).
Secondly, the affidavit was submitted, ex-parte, after the
completion of the trial and the close of Respondent's case.

Such

an ex-parte submission of an affidavit has been held to be neither
legal nor competent evidence. See Zinn v. Tobin Packing Co. . Inc.,
438 P.2d 1110, 1114 (Vt. 1981).
In addition, the heresay affidavit allegedly presented the
bankruptcy judge's opinion regarding a legal issue, to wit, the
legal effect of the rejection of the Lease. A trial court can not
consider an affidavit which merely states the affiant's or a
heresay declarant's legal conclusions.

See Ward v. Durham Life

Ins. , Co., 368 S.E.2d 391, 393 (N.C. App. 1988).
Finally, the affidavit purports to represent a statement of
legal opinion by a bankruptcy judge on the very issue of bankruptcy
law under consideration by the district court.

The appearance of

impropriety created by Respondent's submission of such a document
is sufficient to have required it be stricken by the district
court.

See Phillips v. Clancy, 733 P.2d 300 (Ariz. App. 1986).

The fact that the district court refused to strike the heresay
affidavit of Mr. Rainey and considered its contents in reaching its
decision on a critical issue of law constitutes an abuse of
discretion and reversible error.
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ARGUMENT THIRTEEN
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO STRIKE THE UNCERTIFIED EXHIBITS
ATTACHED TO RESPONDENT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF ITS MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
CONSTITUTES PREJUDICIAL ERROR
Following

the

filing

Judgment, on September

of Appellant's

Motion

for

Summary

15/ 1988/ Respondent filed a pleading

entitled Memorandum Opposing Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion
and Supporting Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
(Rec. pgs. 151-199). Attached to Respondent's Memorandum were six
exhibits.

On September 16/ 1988/ Appellant filed a Motion to

Strike the exhibits attached to Respondent's memorandum.

On

September 19/ 1988/ a hearing was held on the cross motions for
summary judgment and Appellant's Motion to Strike.

(Rec. p. 200).

On October 13/ 1988/ the district court entered a Minute Entry
in which

he granted

Respondent's Motion

for Partial

Summary

Judgment and denied Appellant's Motion to Strike and Motion for
Summary Judgment.

(Rec. p. 322). On that same dayf counsel for

Respondent filed a personal affidavit in an apparent attempt to
remedy the deficiencies of its prior pleadings.

(Rec. pgs. 371-

460).
The district court's denial of Appellant's Motion to Strike
and consideration of Respondent's affidavit constitutes reversible
error.

Rule 569 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/ sets forth the

procedure to be employed in the district courts of the state of
Utah for summary judgments.
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that a party against whom a claim is asserted may move with or
without supporting affidavits for summary judgment in his favor.
Rule 56(c) states that the adversary party prior to the day of
hearing may serve opposing affidavits.
Subparagraph

(c) of Rule

56 also

states

that

sworn or

certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an
affidavit shall be attached thereto and served therewith.

In the

present case, Respondent filed no affidavits or sworn or certified
copies of papers prior to the hearing on Appellant's motion for
summary judgment.

Rather than presenting any facts by means of

affidavit as required by Rule 56, Respondent simply argued numerous
facts in its opposing memorandum and attached uncertified copies
of numerous documents thereto.9
Rule 56(e) like its federal counterpart requires that all
papers relied upon in opposition to a motion for summary judgment
must be sworn or certified and documents filed as exhibits that are
not

certified

or

accompanied

by

appropriate

authenticating

affidavits are inadmissible and should not be considered by the
court.

See Nolla Morell v. Riefkohl, 651 F.Supp 134, 140 (D.

Puerto Rico 1986).

See also In re Teltronics Services, Inc., 18

BR 705, 707 (D.C. E.D. N.Y. 1982).
Notwithstanding the Respondent's blatant disregard of the

9

Although counsel for Respondent subsequently filed an
affidavit after the hearing, that affidavit was filed untimely and
was not made on personal knowledge. Therefore, it should not have
been considered by the district court. See Murray City v. Hall,
663 P.2d 1314, 1320 (Utah 1983); Ward v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 368
S.E.2d 391, 393 (N.C. App. 1988).
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procedural requirements of Rule 56, the district court denied
Appellant's well founded motion to strike.

This denial of his

motion to strike greatly prejudiced Appellant and constitutes
reversible error.
CONCLUSION
Because of the district court's numerous errors, the Judgment
entered against Appellant should be reversed in its entirety and
the case remanded to the district court with instructions to enter
judgment in favor of Appellant dismissing Respondent's Complaint
with prejudice.
Dated this /fet

day of December, 1989

Dctniel W. Jackson
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the /far

day of December, 1989, I

mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document, postage
prepaid, addressed to the following:
Douglas Mortensen
MATHESON, JEPPSON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
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Rule 55

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

as of course to the prevailing party unless the
court otherwise directs; provided, however,
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is
taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding for
review, shall abide the final determination of the
cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers
and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent
permitted by law.
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his
costs must within five days after the entry of
judgment serve upon the adverse party against
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court
a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating
that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct,
and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party
dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within
seven days after service of the memorandum of
costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed
by the court in which the judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after
the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the
service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment,
shall nevertheless be considered as served and
filed on the date judgment is entered.
(3), (4) [Deleted.]
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the
judgment. The clerk must include in any judgment
signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the
same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must,
within two days after the costs have been taxed or
ascertained, in any case where not included in the
judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in
the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the
judgment docket.
(Amended effective January 1, 1985).
Rule 55. Default
(a) Default
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these
rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk
shall enter his default.
(2) Notice to party in default After the
entry of the default of any party, as provided in
Subdivision (ax 1) of this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in default any notice of
action taken or to be taken or to serve any notice
or paper otherwise required by these rules to be
served on a party to the action or proceeding,
except as provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or
in the event that it is necessary for the court to
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of
damages of the nondefaulting party.
(b) Judgment Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(1) By the clerk. When the plain tiffs claim
against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a
sum which can by computation be made certain,
and the defendant has been personally served
otherwise than by publication or by personal service outside of this state, the clerk upon request
of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the
amount due and costs against the defendant, if
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he has been defaulted for failure to appear and j
he is not an infant or incompetent person.
(2) By the court. In all other cases the part
entitled to a judgment by default shall apply t
the court therefor. If, in order to enable the com
to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it i
necessary to take an account or to determine th
amount of damages or to establish the truth c
any averment by evidence or to make an investi
gation of any other matter, the court may COD
duct such hearings or order such references as i
deems necessary and proper.
(c) Setting aside default For good cause show]
the court may set aside an entry of default and, if
judgment by default has been entered, may likewis
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claim
ants. The provisions of this rule apply whether th
party entitled to the judgment by default is a plain
tiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleade
a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgmen
by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c]
(e) Judgment against the state or officer o
agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be en
tered against the state of Utah or against an officer o
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes hi
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to th
court.
(Amended, effective Sept. 4. 1985.)
Rule 56. Summary judgment
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upoi
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain i
declaratory judgment may. at any time after the expi
ration of 20 days from the commencement of the ac
tion or after service of a motion for summary judg
ment by the adverse party, move with or without sup
porting affidavits for a summary judgment in his fa
vor upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom i
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or J
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time
move with or without supporting affidavits for a sum
mary judgment in his favor as to all or any par
thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The mo
tion shall be served at least 10 days before the tin*
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to th
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. Th
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if th<
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, i
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to an]
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on th<
issue of liability alone although there is a genuin<
issue as to the amount of damages.
id) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If oi
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upoi
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial i
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, ty
examining the pleadings and the evidence before i
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable as
certain what material facts exist without substantia
controversy and what material facts are actually ax*
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon mak
an order specifying the facts that appear without sub
stantial controversy, including the extent to whici
the amount of damages or other relief is not in contro
versy, and directing such further proceedings in th
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action th
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facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the
trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the
court may refuse the application for judgment or may
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be
had or may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may
be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Rule 57. Declaratory judgments.
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to Chapter 33 of Title 78, U.C.A. 1953,
shall be in accordance with these rules, and the right
to trial by jury may be demanded under the circumstances and in the manner provided in Rules 38 and
39. The existence of another adequate remedy does
not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases
where it is appropriate. The court may order a speedy
hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and
may advance it on the calendar.
Rule 58A. Entry.
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless
^ e court otherwise directs and subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict of a
jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed,
u there is a special verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories returned by
a
jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the
a
Ppropriate judgment which shall be forthwith
signed by the clerk and filed.
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided
|& Subdivision (a) hereof and Subdivision (b)(1) of
Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge
^ d filed with the clerk.
(c) When judgment entered; notation in regiskr of actions and judgment docket. A judgment is
^uiplete and shall be deemed entered for all purPoses, except the creation of a lien on real property,
*hen the same is signed and filed as herein above
P^vided. The clerk shall immediately make a nota-

Rule 58B

tion of the judgment in the register of actions and the
judgment docket.
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. The
prevailing party shall promptly give notice of the
signing or entry of judgment to all other parties and
shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk
of the court. However, the time for filing a notice of
appeal is not affected by the notice requirement of
this provision.
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party
dies after a verdict or decision upon any issue of fact
and before judgment, judgment may nevertheless be
rendered thereon.
(f) Judgment by confession. Whenever a judgment by confession is authorized by statute, the party
seeking the same must file with the clerk of the court
in which the judgment is to be entered a statement,
verified by the defendant, to the following effect:
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money
due or to become due, it shall concisely state the
claim and that the sum confessed therefor is
justly due or to become due;
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the
purpose of securing the plaintiff against a contingent liability, it must state concisely the claim
and that the sum confessed therefor does not exceed the same;
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for
a specified sum.
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the statement, and enter in the judgment docket, a judgment
of the court for the amount confessed, with costs of
entry, if any.
(Amended, effective Sept. 4, 1985 and Jan. 1, 1987.)
Rule 58B. Satisfaction of judgment.
(a) Satisfaction by owner or attorney. A judgment may be satisfied, in whole or in part, as to any
or all of the judgment debtors, by the owner thereof,
or by the attorney of record of the judgment creditor
where no assignment of the judgment has been filed
and such attorney executes such satisfaction within
eight years after the entry of the judgment, in the
following manner: (1) by written instrument, duly acknowledged by such owner or attorney; or i2) by acknowledgment of such satisfaction signed by the
owner or attorney and entered on the docket of the
judgment in the county where first docketed, with the
date affixed and witnessed by the clerk. Every satisfaction of a part of the judgment, or as to one or more
of the judgment debtors, shall state the amount paid
thereon or for the release of such debtors, naming
them.
(b) Satisfaction by order of court. When a judgment shall have been fully paid and not satisfied of
record, or when the satisfaction of judgment shall
have been lost, the court in which such judgment was
recovered may, upon motion and satisfactory proof,
authorize the attorney of the judgment creditor to
satisfy the same, or may enter an order declaring the
same satisfied and direct satisfaction to be entered
upon the docket.
(c) Entry by clerk. Upon receipt of a satisfaction
of judgment, duly executed and acknowledged, the
clerk shall file the same with the papers in the case,
and enter it on the register of actions. He shall also
enter a brief statement of the substance thereof, including the amount paid, on the margin of the judgment docket, with the date of filing of such satisfaction.
(d) Effect of satisfaction. When a judgment shall
have been satisfied, in whole or in part, or as to any

JUDICIAL CODE

78-36-1
CHAPTER 36

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER
Section
78-36-1.
78-36-2.
78-36-3.

"Forcible entry" defined.
"Forcible detainer" defined.
Unlawful detainer by tenant for term
less than life.
78-36-4.
Right of tenant of agricultural lands to
hold over.
78-36-5.
Remedies available to tenant against
undertenant.
78-36-6.
Notice to quit — How served.
78-36-7.
Necessary parties defendant.
78-36-8.
Allegations permitted in complaint —
Time for appearance — Service of
summons.
78-36-8.5.
Possession bond of plaintiff — Alternative remedies.
78-36-9.
Proof required by plaintiff — Defense.
78-36-10.
Judgment for restitution, damages, and
rent — Immediate enforcement —
Treble damages.
78-36-11.
Time for appeal.
78-36-12.
Exclusion of tenant without judicial process prohibited — Abandoned premises excepted.
78-36-12.3. Definitions.
78-36-12.6. Abandoned premises — Retaking and
rerenting by owner — Liability of tenant — Personal property of tenant left
on premises.
78-36-1. "Forcible entry" defined.
Every person is guilty of a forcible entry, who either:
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or other
parts of a house, or by fraud, intimidation or
stealth, or by any kind of violence or circumstances of terror, enters upon or into any real
property; or,
(2) after entering peaceably upon real property, turns out by force, threats or menacing conduct the party in actual possession.
1953
78-36-2. "Forcible detainer" defined.
Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer who
either:
(1) by force, or by menaces and threats of violence, unlawfully holds and keeps the possession
of any real property, whether the same was acquired peaceably or otherwise; or,
(2) in the nighttime, or during the absence of
the occupants of any real property, unlawfully
enters thereon, and, after demand made for the
surrender thereof, refuses for the period of three
days to surrender the same to such former occupant. The occupant of real property within the
meaning of this subdivision is one who within
five days preceding such unlawful entry was in
the peaceable and undisturbed possession of such
lands.
1953
78-36-3.

Unlawful detainer by tenant for term
less than life.
(1)A tenant of real property, for a term less than
life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer
(a) when he continues in possession, in person
or by subtenant, of the property or any part of it,
after the expiration of the specified term or period for which it is let to him, which specified
term or period, whether established by express or

370;

implied contract, or whether written or parol?
shall be terminated without notice at the expiration of the specified term or period;
(b) when, having leased real property for ani
indefinite time with monthly or other periodic
rent reserved:
(i) he continues in possession of it in per-'
son or by subtenant after the end of any
month or period, in cases where the owner
his designated agent, or any successor in es^
tate of the owner, 15 days or more prior to
the end of that month or period, has served
notice requiring him to quit the premises at
the expiration of that month or period; <&)
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he^
remains in possession of the premises after
the expiration of a notice of not less than five,
days;
(c) when he continues in possession, in person
or by subtenant, after default in the payment of
any rent and after a notice in writing requiring
in the alternative the payment of the rent or the
surrender of the detained premises, has re*
mained uncomplied with for a period of three
days after service, which notice may be served at
any time after the rent becomes due;
;*
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased
premises contrary to the covenants of the lease,
or commits or permits waste on the premises, or
when he sets up or carries on any unlawful business on or in the premises, or when he suffers,
permits, or maintains on or about the premises;
any nuisance, and remains in possession after
service upon him of a three days' notice to quit;*
or
;
(e) when he continues in possession, in person
or by subtenant, after a neglect or failure to per-,
form any condition or covenant of the lease or4
agreement under which the property is held,,
other than those previously mentioned, and after;
notice in writing requiring in the alternative the
performance of the conditions or covenant or the
surrender of the property, served upon him and.
upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the;
premises remains uncomplied with for three days;
after service. Within three days after the service
of the notice, the tenant, any subtenant in actual;
occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of the
term, or other person interested in its contin-,
uance may perform the condition or covenant and
thereby save the lease from forfeiture, except.,
that if the covenants and conditions of the lease
violated by the lessee cannot afterwards be per-;
formed, then no notice need be given.
(2) Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a
mobile home is determined under Chapter 16, Titles
57, Mobile Home Park Residency Act.
***i
..Jm

78-36-4.

Right of tenant of agricultural lands tftj
hold over.
" ?|
In all cases of tenancy upon agricultural lands^
where the tenant has held over and retained possession for more than 60 days after the expiration of his;
term without any demand of possession or notice to
quit by the owner, his designated agent, or his succes-,
sor in estate, he shall be deemed to be held by peraiiBj
sion of the owner, his designated agent, or his succefl^
sor in estate, and shall be entitled to hold under tbjjj
terms of the lease for another full year, and shall ltffe
be guilty of an unlawful detainer during that yea^
and the holding over for the 60-day period shall W|
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78-36-8.5. Possession bond of plaintiff — Alternative remedies.
(1) At any time between the filing of his complaint
78-36-5- Remedies available to tenant against and the entry of final judgment, the plaintifT may
undertenant
execute and file a possession bond. The bond may be
A tenant may take proceedings similar to those in the form of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified
nrescribed in this chapter to obtain possession of the funds, or a property bond executed by two persons
nremises let to an undertenant in case of his unlawful who own real property in the state and who are not
detention of the premises underlet to him.
1953 parties to the action. The court shall approve the
bond in an amount that is the probable amount of
78-36-6. Notice t o quit — H o w s e r v e d .
costs of suit and damages which may result to the
i; iphe notices required by the preceding sections may defendant if the suit has been improperly instituted.
jbe served:
The bond shall be payable to the clerk of the court for
(1) by delivering a copy to the tenant person- the benefit of the defendant for all costs and damages
actually adjudged against the plaintiff. The plaintiff
ally;
(2) by sending a copy through registered or shall notify the defendant that he has filed a possescertified mail addressed to the tenant at his place sion bond. This notice shall be served in the same
manner as service of summons and shall inform the
of residence;
(3) if he is absent from his place of residence or defendant of all of the alternative remedies and profrom his usual place of business, by leaving a cedures under Subsection (2).
(2) The following are alternative remedies and procopy with a person of suitable age and discretion
at either place and mailing a copy to the tenant cedures applicable to an action if the plaintiff files a
at the address of his place of residence or place of possession bond under Subsection 1>:
(a) With respect to an unlawful detainer acbusiness; or
tion based solely upon nonpayment of rent or
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion canutilities, the existing contract shall remain in
not be found at the place of residence, then by
force and the complaint shall be dismissed if the
affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the
defendant, within three days of the service of the
leased property. Service upon a subtenant may
notice of the possession bond, oays accrued rent,
be made in the same manner.
1987
utility charges, any late fee, and other costs, inr78-36-7. N e c e s s a r y parties d e f e n d a n t .
cluding attorney's fees, as provided in the rental
f: No person other than the tenant of the premises,
agreement.
and subtenant if there is one in the actual occupation
(b) The defendant may remain in possession if
flf the premises when the action is commenced, need
he executes and files a counter bond in the form
"be made a party defendant in the proceeding, nor
of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds,
mall any proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be nonor a property bond executed by two persons who
Suited, for the nonjoinder of any person who might
own real property in the state and who are not
lave been made a party defendant; but when it apparties to the action. The form of the bond is at
|«ars that any of the parties served with process or
the defendant's option. The bond shall be payable
ippearing in the proceedings are guilty, judgment
to the clerk of the court. The defendant shall file
must be rendered against them. In case a person has
the bond prior to the expiration of three days
Become subtenant of the premises in controversy affrom the date he is served with notice of the filBr the service of any notice in this chapter provided
ing of plaintiffs possession bond The court shall
Rr, the fact that such notice was not served on such
approve the bond in an amount that is the probaSubtenant shall constitute no defense to the action.
ble amount of costs of suit and actual damages
HA persons who enter under the tenant after the comthat may result to the plaintiff if the defendant
pencement of the action hereunder shall be bound by
has improperly withheld possession. The court
jne judgment the same as if they had been made parshall consider prepaid rent to the owner as a porB»s to the action.
1953
tion of the defendant's total bond.
(c) The defendant, upon demand, shall be
E|36-8. Allegations permitted in complaint —
granted a hearing to be held prior to the expiraBr
Time for appearance — Service of
tion of three days from the date the defendant is
•?•
summons.
served with notice of the filing of plaintiffs posW^e plaintiff in his complaint, in addition to setting
session bond.
jyth the facts on which he seeks to recover, may set
{?>) If t h e defendant does not elect and comply with
• P a any circumstances of fraud, force, OT violence
• r a h may have accompanied the alleged forcible a remedy under Subsection (2) within the required
R^y* or forcible or unlawful detainer, and claim time, the plaintiff, upon ex parte motion, shall be
BJPages therefor or compensation for the occupation granted an order of restitution. The constable of the
Bpke premises, or both. If the unlawful detainer precinct or the sheriff of the county where the propBffifed is after default in the payment of rent, the erty is situated shall return possession of the propBgplaint shall state the amount of rent due. The erty to the plaintiff promptly.
W&r-j ^all indorse on the summons the number of (4) If the defendant demands a hearing under SubBE* within which the defendant is required to ap- section (2)(c), and if the court rules after the hearing
KR and defend the action, which shall not be less that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the propB 9 j three or more than 20 days from the date of erty, the constable or sheriff shall promptly return
B p ? 6 ' The court may authorize service by publica- possession of the property to the plaintiff. If at the
KP or mail for cause shown. Service by publication is hearing the court allows the defendant to remain in
•PPlete one week after publication. Service by mail possession and further issues remain to be adjudiIBflH-?6*6 t n r e e ^ a v s a ^ e r rnsLiling. The summons
cated between the parties, the court shall require the
E $ | j be changed in form to conform to the time of defendant to post a bond as required in Subsection
H ^ v ^ as ordered, and shall be served as in other (2)(b). If at the hearing the court rules that all issues
between the parties can be adjudicated without fur™^*
1987

taken and construed as a consent on the part of the
tenant to hold for another year.
i»8i
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ther court proceedings, the court shall, upon adjudicating those issues, enter judgment on the merits.
1987

78-36-9. Proof required by plaintiff — Defense.
On the trial of any proceeding for any forcible entry
or forcible detainer the plaintiff shall only be required to show, in addition to the forcible entry or
forcible detainer complained of, that he was peaceably in the actual possession at the time of the forcible entry, or was entitled to the possession at the
time of the forcible detainer. The defendant may
show in his defense that he or his ancestors, or those
whose interest in such premises he claims, had been
in the quiet possession thereof for the space of one
whole year continuously next before the commencement of the proceedings, and that his interest therein
is not then ended or determined; and such showing is
a bar to the proceedings.
1953
78-36-10.

37£

(1) "Willful exclusion" means preventing the ten.
ant from entering into the premises with intent to
deprive the tenant of such entry.
(2) "Owner" means the actual owner of the prenv
ises and shall also have the same meaning as landlord under common law and the statutes of this state,
(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of thefol-.
lowing situations:
(a) The tenant has not notified the owner that
he or she will be absent from the premises, and
the tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days after
the due date, and there is no reasonable evidence
other than the presence of the tenant's personal
property that the tenant is occupying the premises; or
' .^
(b) The tenant has not notified the owner that'
he or she will be absent from the premises, and<
the tenant fails to pay rent when due and the"
tenant's personal property has been removed
from the dwelling unit and there is no reasonable
evidence that the tenant is occupying the premises.
1961

J u d g m e n t for restitution, damages,
and rent — Immediate enforcement —
Treble damages.
( 1 ) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or 78-36-12.6. Abandoned premises — Retaking
and rerenting by o w n e r — Liability of
upon default. A judgment entered in favor of the
tenant — Personal property of tenant
plaintiff shall include an order for the restitution of
le/t on premises.
the premises. If the proceeding is for unlawful de(1) In the event of abandonment the owner may
tainer after neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under retake the premises and attempt to rent them at a
which the property is held, or after default in the fair rental value and the tenant who abandoned the
payment of rent, the judgment shall also declare the premises shall be liable:
(a) for the entire rent due for the remainder of
forfeiture of the lease or agreement.
the term: or
:^
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried
(b) for rent accrued during the period neceswithout a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall
sary to re-rent the premises at a fair rental
also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff
value, plus the difference between the fair rental
from any of the following:
value and the rent agreed to in the prior rental
(a) forcible entry;
agreement, plus a reasonable commission for the
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
renting of the premises and the costs, if any, nec(c) waste of the premises during the defenessary to restore the rental unit to its condition
dant's tenancy, if waste is alleged in the comwhen rented by the tenant less normal wear anil
plaint and proved at trial; and
tear. This subsection applies, if less than Subsec(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged untion (a) notwithstanding that the owner did not
lawful detainer is after default in the payment of
re-rent the premises.
rent.
(2) If the tenant has abandoned the premises and
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for three times the amount of the has left personal property on the premises, the owner
damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a) through is entitled to remove the property from the dwelling,
(2)(c), and for reasonable attorney's fees, if they are store it for the tenant, and recover actual moving and
storage costs from the tenant. The owner shall make
provided for in the lease or agreement.
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after reasonable efforts to notify the tenant of the location
default in the payment of the rent, execution upon of the personal property; however, if the property has
the judgment shall be issued immediately after the been in storage for over 30 days and the tenant has
entry of the judgment. In all cases, the judgment may made no reasonable effort to recover it, the owner
may sell the property and apply the proceeds toward
be issued and enforced immediately.
1987
any amount the tenant owes. Any money left over
from the sale of the property shall be handled as spec78-36-11. T i m e for appeal.
Either party may, within ten days, appeal from the ified in Section 78-44-18. Nothing contained in this
judgment rendered.
1953 act shall be in derogation of or alter the ownerfs
rights under Chapter 3, Title 38.
M*
78-36-12. E x c l u s i o n of t e n a n t w i t h o u t judicial
process prohibited — A b a n d o n e d
C H A P T E R 37
premises excepted.
It is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a
MORTGAGE F O R E C L O S U R E
tenant from the tenant's premises in any manner except by judicial process, provided, an owner or his Section
agent shall not be prevented from removing the con- 78-37-1.
Form of action — Judgment — Special •
w
tents of the leased premises under Subsection
execution.
*f
78-36-12.6(2) and retaking the premises and attempt- 78-37-2.
Deficiency judgment — Execution.
^
ing to rent them at a fair rental value when the ten- 78-37-3.
Necessary parties — Unrecorded rig&&;
ant has abandoned the premises.
1981
barred.
**; *
78-37-4.
Sales — Disposition of surplus money*;V
78-36-12.3. Definitions.
78-37-5.
Sales — When debt due in i n s t a l l m e n t
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read another meaning into section 330 in order to arrive at a preferable result. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Levin & Weintraub (In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp.), 739 F.2d 73, 10 C.B.C.2d 1309 (2d Cir.
1984).
The knowledge of the pendency of an appeal from a bankruptcy
court's order granting a lender special priority does not, in itself,
forfeit the protections that the Code gives to a lender even though the
lender knows that there are objections to the order; however, if the
lender knows his priority is improper but proceeds anyway in the
hope that a stay will not be sought or if sought will not be granted,
the lender is acting in bad faith and upon appeal the priority should
not be allowed. In the Matter of EDC Holding Co., 676 F.2d 945, 6
C.B.C.2d 882 (7th Cir. 1982).
A bankruptcy court order authorizing a chapter 11 trustee to obtain credit secured by a senior lien is not clearly erroneous when
there is substantial evidence that the trustee would not have been
able to obtain adequate credit without granting of such lien. In the
Matter of Stanley Motel, Inc., 6 C.B.C.2d 116 (D. Colo. 1982).

References
2 Collier on Bankruptcy Ch. 364 (15th ed. 1988).
2 Collier Bankruptcy Manual Ch. 364 (3d ed. 1988).
3 Collier Bankruptcy Practice Guide Ch. 44 (1988).
Comment, Obtaining Operating Capital in a Chapter 11 Reorganization
Proceeding Under § 363(c) and § 364(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, 1983
Ann. Surv. Bankr. L. 217.
Dixon, Jr., Use of Cash Collateral and Its Proceeds in Bankruptcy, 3 Legal Notes & Viewpoints Q. 75 (1983).
Giraydo, Revolving and Non-Revolving Credit Arrangements and the
New Bankruptcy Code, 97 The Banking L.J. 806 (1980).
SECTION 366 (11 U.S.C. § 365)
§ 365. Executory contracts and unexpired leases.
(a) Except as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title
and in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section, the trustee,
subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.
(b)(1) If there has been a default in an executory contract
or unexpired lease of the debtor, the trustee may not assume
such contract or lease unless, at the time of assumption of such
contract or lease, the trustee—
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(A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the
trustee will promptly cure, such default;
(B) compensates, or provides adequate assurance that
the trustee will promptly compensate, a party other
than the debtor to such contract or lease, for any actual
pecuniary loss to such party resulting from such default; and
(C) provides adequate assurance of future performance under such contract or lease.
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to a
default that is a breach of a provision relating to—
(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor
at any time before the closing of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a
trustee in a case under this title or a custodian before
such commencement.
(3) For the purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection
and paragraph (2)(B) of subsection (f), adequate assurance of future performance of a lease of real property in a
shopping center includes adequate assurance—
(A) of the source of rent and other consideration due
under such lease, and in the case of an assignment, that
the financial condition and operating performance of
the proposed assignee and its guarantors, if any, shall
be similar to the financial condition and operating performance of the debtor and its guarantors, if any, as of
the time the debtor became the lessee under the lease;
(B) that any percentage rent due under such lease
will not decline substantially;
(C) that assumption or assignment of such lease is
subject to all the provisions thereof, including (but not
limited to) provisions such as a radius, location, use, or
exclusivity provision, and will not breach any such provision contained in any other lease, financing agreement, or master agreement relating to such shopping
center; and
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(D) that assumption or assignment of such lease will
not disrupt any tenant mix or balance in such shopping
center.
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section,
if there has been a default in an unexpired lease of the
debtor, other than a default of a kind specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the trustee may not require a
lessor to provide services or supplies incidental to such
lease before assumption of such lease unless the lessor is
compensated under the terms of such lease for any services and supplies provided under such lease before assumption of such lease.
(c) The trustee may not assume or assign an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if—
(1)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the
debtor, to such contract or lease from accepting performance from or rendering performance to an entity other
than the debtor or the debtor in possession, whether or not
such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of
rights or delegation of duties; and
(B) such party does not consent to such assumption
or assignment; or
(2) such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend
other debt financing or financial accommodations, to or
for the benefit of the debtor, or to issue a security of the
debtor; or
(3) such lease is of nonresidential real property and has
been terminated under applicable nonbankruptcy law
prior to the order for relief.
(d)(1) In a case under chapter 7 of this title, if the trustee
does not assume or reject an executory contract or unexpired
lease of residential real property or of personal property of the
debtor within 60 days after the order for relief, or within such
additional time as the court, for cause, within such 60-day period, fixes, then such contract or lease is deemed rejected.
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(2) In a case under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title,
the trustee may assume or reject an executory contract or
unexpired lease of residential real property or of personal
property of the debtor at any time before the confirmation
of a plan but the court, on request of any party to such
contract or lease, may order the trustee to determine
within a specified period of time whether to assume or reject such contract or lease.
(3) The trustee shall timely perform all the obligations
of the debtor, except those specified in section 365(b)(2),
arising from and after the order for relief under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real property, until such
lease is assumed or rejected, notwithstanding section
503(b)(1) of this title. The court may extend, for cause,
the time for performance of any such obligation that
arises within 60 days after the date of the order for relief,
but the time for performance shall not be extended beyond
such 60-day period. This subsection shall not be deemed to
affect the trustee's obligations under the provisions of
subsection (b) or (f) of this section. Acceptance of any
such performance does not constitute waiver or relinquishment of the lessor's rights under such lease or under this
title.
(4) Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), in a case
under any chapter of this title, if the trustee does not assume or reject an unexpired lease of nonresidential real
property under which the debtor is the lessee within 60
days after the date of the order for relief, or within such
additional time as the court, for cause, within such 60-day
period, fixes, then such lease is deemed rejected, and the
trustee shall immediately surrender such nonresidential
real property to the lessor.
(e)(1) Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract
or unexpired lease, or in applicable law, an executory contract
or unexpired lease of the debtor may not be terminated or
modified, and any right or obligation under such contract or
lease may not be terminated or modified, at any time after the
commencement of the case solely because of a provision in such
contract or lease that is conditioned on—
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(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor
at any time before the closing of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a
trustee in a case under this title or a custodian before
such commencement.
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to
an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor,
whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts
assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if—
(A)(i) applicable law excuses a party, other than the
debtor, to such contract or lease from accepting performance from or rendering performance to the trustee or
to an assignee of such contract or lease, whether or not
such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment
of rights or delegation of duties; and
(ii) such party does not consent to such assumption
or assignment; or
(B) such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend other debt financing or financial accommodations,
to or for the benefit of the debtor, or to issue a security
of the debtor.
(f)(1) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section,
notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, or in applicable law, that prohibits,
restricts, or conditions the assignment of such contract or
lease, the trustee may assign such contract or lease under paragraph (2) of this subsection.
(2) The trustee may assign an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor only if—
(A) the trustee assumes such contract or lease in accordance with the provisions of this section; and
(B) adequate assurance of future performance by the
assignee of such contract or lease is provided, whether
or not there has been a default in such contract or lease.
(3) Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, or in applicable law
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that terminates or modifies, or permits a party other than
the debtor to terminate or modify, such contract or lease
or a right or obligation under such contract or lease on account of an assignment of such contract or lease, such contract, lease, right, or obligation may not be terminated or
modified under such provision because of the assumption
or assignment of such contract or lease by the trustee.
(g) Except as provided in subsections (h)(2) and (i)(2) of
this section, the rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a breach of such contract
or lease—
(1) if such contract or lease has not been assumed under
this section or under a plan confirmed under chapter 9,
11, 12, or 13 of this title, immediately before the date of
the filing of the petition; or
(2) if such contract or lease has been assumed under
this section or under a plan confirmed under chapter 9,
11,12, or 13 of this title—
(A) if before such rejection the case has not been converted under section 1112, 1307, or 1208 of this title, at
the time of such rejection; or
(B) if before such rejection the case has been converted under section 1112,1307, or 1208 of this title—
(i) immediately before the date of such conversion,
if such contract or lease was assumed before such conversion; or
(ii) at the time of such rejection, if such contract or
lease was assumed after such conversion.
(h)(1) If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property of the debtor under which the debtor is the lessor, or a
timeshare interest under a timeshare plan under which the
debtor is the timeshare interest seller, the lessee or timeshare
interest purchaser under such lease or timeshare plan may
treat such lease or timeshare plan as terminated by such rejection, where the disaffirmance by the trustee amounts to such a
breach as would entitle the lessee or timeshare interest purchaser to treat such lease or timeshare plan as terminated by
virtue of its own terms, applicable nonbankruptcy law, or
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other agreements the lessee or timeshare interest purchaser has
made with other parties; or, in the alternative, the lessee or
timeshare interest purchaser may remain in possession of the
leasehold or timeshare interest under any lease or timeshare
plan the term of which has commenced for the balance of such
term and for any renewal or extension of such term that is enforceable by such lessee or timeshare interest purchaser under
applicable nonbankruptcy law.
(2) If such lessee or timeshare interest purchaser remains in possession as provided in paragraph (1) of this
subsection, such lessee or timeshare interest purchaser
may offset against the rent reserved under such lease or
moneys due for such timeshare interest for the balance of
the term after the date of the rejection of such lease or
timeshare interest, and any such renewal or extension
thereof, any damages occurring after such date caused by
the nonperformance of any obligation of the debtor under
such lease or timeshare plan after such date, but such lessee or timeshare interest purchaser does not have any
rights against the estate on account of any damages arising after such date from such rejection, other than such
offset.
(i)(l) If the trustee rejects an executory contract of the
debtor for the sale of real property or for the sale of a timeshare interest under a timeshare plan, under which the purchaser is in possession, such purchaser may treat such contract
as terminated, or, in the alternative, may remain in possession
of such real property or timeshare interest.
(2) if such purchaser remains in possession—
(A) such purchaser shall continue to make all payments due under such contract, but may, offset against
such payments any damages occurring after the date of
the rejection of such contract caused by the non-performance of any obligation of the debtor after such date,
but such purchaser does not have any rights against the
estate on account of any damages arising after such
date from such rejection, other than such offset; and
(B) the trustee shall deliver title to such purchaser in
accordance with the provisions of such contract, but is
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relieved of all other obligations to perform under such
contract.
(j) A purchaser that treats an executory contract as terminated under subsection (i) of this section, or a party whose executory contract to purchase real property from the debtor is
rejected and under which such party is not in possession, has a
lien on the interest of the debtor in such property for the recovery of any portion of the purchase price that such purchaser or party has paid.
(k) Assignment by the trustee to an entity of a contract or
lease assumed under this section relieves the trustee and the
estate from any liability for any breach of such contract or
lease occurring after such assignment.
(1) If an unexpired lease under which the debtor is the lessee
is assigned pursuant to this section, the lessor of the property
may require a deposit or other security for the performance of
the debtor's obligations under the lease substantially the same
as would have been required by the landlord upon the initial
leasing to a similar tenant.
(m) For purposes of this section 365 and sections 541(b)(2)
and 362(b)(10), leases of real property shall include any rental
agreement to use real property.

Legislative History
Subsection (a) of this section authorizes the trustee, subject to the
court's approval, to assume or reject an executory contract or unexpired lease. Though there is no precise definition of what contracts
are executory, it generally includes contracts on which performance
remains due to some extent on both sides. A note is not usually an
executory contract if the only performance that remains is repayment. Performance on one side of the contract would have been completed and the contract is no longer executory.
Because of the sensitive nature of the commodities markets and
the special provisions governing commodity broker liquidations in
sub-chapter IV of chapter 7, the provisions governing rejection, liquidation, or termination of open contractual commitments under proposed 11 U.S.C. § 765, and the provisions governing distribution in
proposed 11 U.S.C. § 767 (a) and (c) [should be section 766] will govern if any conflict between those provisions and the provisions of this
section arise.
[House Report No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 347 (1977); See Senate
Report No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1978). ]
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In rt GILES ASSOCIATES,
LTD., Debtor.
Bankruptcy No. 88-50040-A.
United States Bankruptcy Court,
W.D. Texas,
San Antonio Division.
Aug. 8, 1988.
Landlord filed motion seeking to have
commercial lease deemed rejected. The
Bankruptcy Court, R. Glen Ayers, Jr.,
Chief Judge, held that automatic rejection
of a lease based on a debtor's failure to
assume or reject lease within 60 days after
filing was not merely "breach" of lease,
but, rather, terminated lease as to all parties, including secured creditors.
So ordered.
1. Bankruptcy <&=>3115
Automatic rejection of a lease based on
a debtor's failure to assume or reject lease
within 60 days after filing was not merely
"breach" of lease, but, rather, terminated
lease as to all parties, including secured
creditors.
Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 365(dX4).
2. Bankruptcy <s=>3103(8)
Bankruptcy Code provision for automatic rejection of lease upon debtor's failure to assume or reject within 60 days of
filing of petition is not affected by separate
state law doctrines concerning termination
of lease, including strong presumption under state law that there could be no implied
termination and forfeiture of lease.
Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(d)(4).
3. Bankruptcy <*=>3103(8)
Lease provision requiring some notice
of breach by landlord to debtor lessee was
irrelevant to deemed rejection of lease
based upon debtor's failure to assume or
reject within 60 days of filing of Chapter 11
petition; deemed rejection occurs as matter
of law under Bankruptcy Code, rather than
due to any contractual breach by debtor
lessee.
Bankr.Code,
11
U.S.C.A.
§ 365(d)(4).

4. Bankruptcy <*=»3103(8)
Landlord's acceptance of rental payments from lienholder on behalf of debtor
lessee, without some pleading being filed in
bankruptcy court, was not acceptance, assumption, or some other treatment of lease
by landlord, and thus did not preclude lease
from being deemed rejected due to debtor's
failure to assume or reject within 60 days
postpetitdon. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 365(d)(4).
5. Bankruptcy ^3103(8)
Landlord's knowledge of lienholder's
security interest in Chapter 11 debtor's
lease did not impose any affirmative duty
on landlord concerning rights of lienholder
required to be exercised before lease could
be deemed rejected based on debtor's failure to assume or reject within 60 days
postpetition.
Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 365(d)(4).
6. Bankruptcy <s=>3114
Default based on Chapter 11 debtor's
failure to assume or reject lease within 60
days was not default under lease, and thus,
lease provision granting option allowing
debtor lienholder to cure defects under
lease was inapplicable. Bankr.Code, 11
U.S.C.A. § 365(dX4).

Garvin Stryker, Law Offices of Garvin P.
Stryker, San Antonio, Tex., for debtor.
David Gragg, Jeffers, Brook, Kreager
and Gragg, San Antonio, Tex., for City of
San Antonio.
William H. Lemons, Cox & Smith Inc.,
San Antonio, Tex., for N a t Bank of Commerce.
R. GLEN AYERS, Jr., Chief Judge.
Attorneys for the debtor, Garvin Stryker
of the Law Offices of Garvin Stryker for
the City of San Antonio, Mr. David Gragg,
Jeffers, Brook, Kreager and Gragg, for the
National Bank of Commerce, William Lemons of Cox and Smith.
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FACTS

The debtor, Giles Associates, Ltd., filed a
voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code on January 4, 1988.
Since that date, the debtor has operated its
business as a debtor in possession. The
debtor owns, operates or leases a commercial office building located on Alamo Plaza
in San Antonio, Texas. In fact, the debtor
owns one-half of a building immediately
across the plaza from the Alamol and leases (or leased) one-half of that same building
from the City of San Antonio.
The National Bank of Commerce has a
first lien pursuant to a deed of trust on the
one-half of the building owned by the debtor. The debtor also gave the bank a lien
on its leasehold interest as additional collateral.2
Following the date of the petition in
bankruptcy, the bank tendered several
rental payments to the City which were
duly accepted. Unfortunately, neither the
debtor nor the bank took any action to
assume the lease between the debtor and
the City within the sixty day period set
forth at § 365(d)(4).
[1] Eventually, the City of San Antonio
noticed that error and filed a motion seeking to have the lease deemed rejected. In
an interesting response, premised primarily
on a decision by Jay Gueck, formerly United States Bankruptcy Judge, District of
Colorado, the bank alleged that § 365(d)(4)
did not work a termination of the leasehold
even if the lease was "deemed rejected"
under that section. See In re Storage
Technology Corp., 53 B.R. 471 (Bankr.D.
Colo. 1985). This Court rejects the reasoning of the Colorado opinion and other similar opinions cited by the bank and adopts
the rationale set forth in cases such as In
re Bernard, 69 B.R. 13 (Bankr.D. Hawaii
1986), which holds that automatic rejection
1. No, not across the alley from the Alamo.
2. This matter will eventually be settled. This
opinion will only determine whether the National Bank of Commerce or the City of San
Antonio has the whip hand. The case will be
settled because the entrance to the building is
located on the leasehold premises while the public restrooms are located on the owned premis-

of the lease under § 365(d)(4) terminates a
lease as to all parties, including creditors.
The issues are really very simple and
straightforward.
Under § 365(dX4), a
lease of non-residential real property is
deemed rejected sixty days after the date
of a petition in bankruptcy (under Chapter
11 or any other chapter) unless the trustee
or debtor-in-possession takes some action
to preserve the lease, either by filing a
motion to assume or by filing a motion to
extend the time for assumption or rejection. See generally, In re Southwest Aircraft Services, Inc., 831 F.2d 848 (9th Cir.
1987). If no action is taken, the lease is
deemed rejected, and the trustee or debtor
in possession must surrender possession of
the premises.
[2] This bankruptcy provision is not affected by separate state law doctrines concerning the termination of leases. Because
state law does not control this issue, the
Court need not consider the strong presumption under state law that there can be
no implied termination and forfeiture of a
lease. See, e.g., Wendlandt v. Sommers
Drug Stores Co., 551 S.W.2d 488 (Tex.Civ.
App.—Austin 1977, writ ref d. n.r.e.). If
the state law were relevant the doctrine of
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 99
S.Ct 914, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979) would, of
course, require this Court to look to state
law. However, here it is very clear that
the federal policy concerning leases and
inaction on the part the debtor-lessor clearly supersedes any state law considerations.
[3] Likewise, the fact that the lease in
this case required some notice of breach to
be provided by the City to the debtor-lessee
is also irrelevant. The lease has not been
rejected due to any contractual breach by
the lessee; the lease is deemed rejected as
a matter of law as set forth in the Bankruptcy Code.
es; the telephone system is located on the
owned premises while the pump station is located on the leased premises; stairwell is located
in both halves of the premises and both are
necessary to meet the fire code; the elevator is
located on the leased premises and the water
lines are on the owned side.
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Cite a* 92 B.R. 495 (Bkrtcy. W.D.Tex. 1988)

[4] A similar analysis also defeats any
claim that the City has somehow accepted
an assumption or other treatment of this
lease by accepting the rent payments from
the lienholder, the National Bank of Commerce. First, lease assumption is something more than the acceptance of rental
payments, as ably set forth in opinions
such as In re Southwest Aircraft Services,
Inc., 53 B.R. 805 (Bankr.C.D. Ca.1985),
rev yd on other grds., 831 F.2d 848 (9th Cir.
1988). Further, assumption of a lease cannot occur without some pleading being filed
with the Court. That is quite clear from
§ 365(b) and Bankruptcy Rule 6006. Finally, § 365(d)(3) makes mandatory the payment of all sums due under a lease from
the debtor-lessee to a lessor, irrespective of
whether or not assumption or rejection occurs. § 365(d)(3) operates independently of
§ 365(d)(4). The requirement of monthly
payments is very clear and has nothing to
do with the issue of assumption or rejection. See, e.g., In re Southwest Aircraft
Services, Inc., 53 B.R. 805.
[5] The security interest held by the
bank, the existence of which was known to
the City of San Antonio, cannot be said to
impose any affirmative duties on the City
of San Antonio concerning the rights of the
National Bank of Commerce. To the best
of this Court's knowledge, there exists no
such duty on behalf of the City.
[6] Finally, although the lease may provide options allowing the debtor or some
third party lienholder to cure defaults under the lease, it is very clear from these
facts that no default has occurred under
the lease. The default is under a separate
statutory mandate not linked in anyway
whatsoever to the terms of the lease.
All of this leads back to In re Storage
Technology Corp., 53 B.R. 471 (Bankr.D.
Colo.1985), which must be addressed. Basically, Judge Gueck's opinion holds that
rejection of a lease under § 365(dX4) is
merely a "breach" of the lease. See
§ 365(g). Since a breach does not terminate a lease—and, since § 365(dX4) does
not itself use the word "terminate"—Judge
Gueck ruled that failure to act under
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§ 365(d)(4) did "not have the conclusive effect of terminating the lease." Id. at 475.
This analysis would make some sense if
the Bankruptcy Code at § 365(d)(4) and the
legislative history of that section were not
so very clear. First, the legislative history
of the so-called "shopping center" amendments enacted as part of the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act ("BAFJA"):
The bill would lessen the problems
caused by extended vacancies and partial
operation of tenant space by requiring
that the trustee decide whether to assume or reject nonresidential real property lease within 60 days after the order
for relief in a case under any chapter.
This time period could be extended by
the court for cause, such as m exceptional cases involving large numbers of leases. One of the minor changes in this
subtitle was to limit it to nonresidential
real property leases. If the lease is not
assumed or rejected within this 60-day
period, or any additional period granted
by the court, the lease is deemed rejected
and the trustee must immediately surrender the property to the lessor.

The acceptance by the lessor of any payments made by the trustee as required
by . . . [§ 365(d)(3) ] does not constitute a
waiver or relinquishment of the lessor's
rights under such lease or under the
bankruptcy code.
130 Cong.Rec. S8894-95 (Daily Ed. June 29,
1984).
Further, the statute is clear. Failure to
act results in first rejection and next in an
absolute obligation to surrender the premises: "If the trustee does not assume or
reject an unexpired l e a s e — , then such
lease is deemed rejected, and the trustee
shall immediately surrender such nonresidential real property to the lessor."
§ 365(dX4).
To say, as Judge Gueck, that the failure
to act is merely a "breach" is not consistent with either that statute or its history.
Why not? Because § 365(dX4) deems that
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the trustee or debtor has, by failing to act,
breached the lease and that the breach is so
serious that immediate surrender is mandatory. The breach plus the surrender obligation can only be seen as termination of
any of the trustee's or debtor's rights in
the leasehold. Otherwise, the face of the
statute and its history are meaningless.
Further, Judge Gueck's reliance upon the
use of different terms—"rejection",
"breach", and "termination''—at different
sections of the Code is not proper. Yes,
Congress could have and should have used
consistent terms, but Congressional inconsistency creates no presumptions. Cf. In
re Storage Technology Corp., 53 B.R. at
474.
For example, "breach" is equated with
"rejection" at § 365(g) so as to make postpetition rejection give rise to a pre-petition
(non-priority) claim. This section—§ 365(g)
—does not, therefore, merely define "rejection" or "breach", although Judge Gueck
implies as much. Id. at 474.
Where "termination" is used in the context of a lease, as in § 502(b)(6), Judge
Gueck is right to say that the term is used
to limit claims. Id. He stretches to conclude, however, that this shows that "[t]he
drafters of § 365 apparently knew the difference between breach and termination."
Id.
The key to the Gueck analysis is the use
of "equity", which he says requires protection of parties in a position similar to that
of the bank in this case. Id. The "equity"
done is not permissible. It rewrites the
Code. The mandate of section 365(d)(4) is
clear: Act within sixty days or loose possession.
Failure to act is rejection and a rejected
lease can never thereafter be assumed or
rejected in a chapter 11 case. See
§ 1123(b)(2): "a plan may . . . provide for
assumption ... of any ... lease ... not
previously rejected ...". In a chapter 7
case, the lease cannot be assumed by a
trustee—at least by implication—since
§ 365(a) directs the trustee as able to assume or reject. Presumably, while the
trustee can assume and then reject, under
§ 365(gX2), the trustee cannot reject and

then assume, for § 365 makes no provision
for such a sequence.
Analysis of the Code, then, clearly shows
that § 365(d)(4) terminates leases. The
poor creditor in the position of the bank,
done in by this provision, is in no worse
position than a second lienholder faced with
a § 362 motion for relief where the debtor
cannot provide adequate protection. The
bank must act to protect itself. This Court
does not have a "roving commission to do
equity." See United States v. Sutton, 786
F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir.1986). It will not,
should not, and cannot protect the bank or
the debtor from the consequences of inactivity, for those consequences are clearly
mandated by the Code and by Congress.
An order will be submitted by the City.

In re Efraim ABRAMOFF and Orah
Abramoff, Debtors.
Efraim ABRAMOFF and Orah
Abramoff, Plaintiffs,
v.
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF
GEORGIA, Defendant.
Bankruptcy No. 5-86-00173-A-ll.
Adv. No. 87-5290-A.
United States Bankruptcy Court,
W.D. Texas,
San Antonio Division.
Sept 30, 1988.

Debtor sought to avoid penalty paid to
secured creditor prepetition, upon acceleration of note. The Bankruptcy Court, R.
Glen Ayers, Jr., Chief Judge, held that* (1)
payment was avoidable as fraudulent
transfer, and (2) payment was avoidable as
usurious interest.
Judgment for debtor.
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International,
D.N.Y.1983).

Inc., 28 B.R. 324 (Bkrtcy.S.

Because the Court has determined that
Manville's insurance is property of the estate under the Code and that actions by
third parties against the bankrupt's insurers are automatically stayed upon the filing
of the petition, we need not address GAF's
contention that the Bankruptcy Court had
no authority to stay proceedings against
Manville's insurers pursuant to § 105.
However, as this Court has observed in
addressing Lake's appeal, the Court will
normally have power under § 105 "to enjoin actions excepted from the automatic
stay which might interfere in the rehabilitative process." 2 Collier on Bankruptcy
§ 362.02.
Conclusion
The Bankruptcy Court's order of April
14, 1983 pertaining to the automatic stay,
and its order of May 23, 1983 granting the
Debtor's motion to dismiss Lake's April 20,
1983 complaint, are affirmed, insofar as
they are sought to be reviewed in the three
appeals addressed by the Court herein. In
so doing, this Court reiterates that affirmance of these denials of relief from the stay
by the Bankruptcy Court is without prejudice to future application(s) for complete or
partial relief from the stays imposed pursuant to § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code and
the Bankruptcy Court's prior orders, based
on the circumstances and the equities of
the case as they may then exist.
So Ordered.

In re James K. MAXWELL, Jr.. Debtor.
Charles J. Myler, Trustee.
CHART HOUSE, INC., Plaintiff,
James E. MAXWELL, Jr., as Debtor and
Charles J. Myler, as Trustee,
Defendants.
Nos. S3 C 5661 (82 B 6593) (82 A 3063).
United States District Court,
N.D. Illinois, E.D.
Mav 2, 1984.
Franchisor-lessor appealed from an order of the Bankruptcy Court, 30 B.R. 982,
Robert L. Eisen, J., denying its motion to
lift automatic stay. The District Court,
Moran, J., held that: (1) termination of
sublease effectively terminated franchise;
(2) sublease had been terminated before
debtor filed for bankruptcy; (3) debtor in
possession's interest in the leasehold was
not sufficient to revive the terminated
lease. (4) landlord's acceptance of payment
for rent after termination did not waive
termination of the lease; and (5) franchisor-lessor was not estopped to argue
that the lease had been validly terminated.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Contracts <S=>215(2)
Termination of sublease would also
serve to terminate franchise agreement, assuming that pretermination procedures for
the franchise agreement had been followed,
where the franchise was limited to specific
premises which were the subject of the
sublease and the franchise was worthless
without a location to operate.
2. Contracts <e=>217
Where viability of franchise agreement
rested upon continued existence of sublease, landlord-franchisor's notice of impending termination of sublease and its
filing of suit in state court clearly advised
tenant-franchisee of the termination of the
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relationship between the parties in accordance with the franchise agreement.
3. Contracts 0=215(1)
Absent express contractual language,
court must adopt reasonable construction
of termination provision in franchise agreement.
4. Landlord and Tenant 0=94(1), 119(1)
Under Illinois law, landlord terminated
lease by sending five-day notice of filing
suit for possession and, upon expiration of
the. five-day notice, tenant lost its leasehold
interest and became a tenant at sufferance.
5. Bankruptcy 0=255
Bankruptcy court cannot resurrect a
lease which has been terminated prior to
the filing of bankruptcy.
6. Landlord and Tenant 0=94(1), 288
In Illinois, statutory notice procedure
for terminating a lease and a forcible entry
and detainer action are two distinct things;
the former process ends a contractual relationship between the parties while the forcible entry and detainer action determines
the right to possession of property.
7. Bankruptcy 0=659(2.2)
Debtor-tenant in possession has a
slight equitable interest which is protected
by the automatic stay. Bankr.Code, 11
U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(1).
8. Bankruptcy 0=659(2.2)
As debtor in possession under terminated lease which left it with only a tenancy at sufferance, debtor had limited equitable interest which was protected by automatic stay. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 362(d).
9. Bankruptcy 0=255
Fact that automatic stay gives limited
and temporary protection to holdover tenant-debtor based solely on naked possession does not mean that there is a viable
executory contract which a debtor can assume. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 363.
10. Bankruptcy C=255
Even if "debtor-franchisee had some
protectible equitable interest stemming

from continued occupation of restaurant
premises, that interest was not sufficient to
revive a sublease which had previously
been terminated by the franchisor-landlord
and that sublease could not be assumed by
the trustee.
11. Landlord and Tenant 0=112(2)
Landlord can waive termination of a
lease by accepting entire amount of default.
12. Landlord and Tenant 0=103(1)
Partial cure of default by tenant, even
before expiration of the five-day notice, is
not sufficient to avoid termination.
13. Landlord and Tenant o=ll2(2)
Landlord's acceptance of rent and other payments from a tenant at sufferance
does not revive a terminated lease.
14. Landlord and Tenant 0=196
Liability for rent continues so long as
the tenant is in possession.
15. Bankruptcy 0=673
Courts will not revive a terminated
lease simply because of the lease's importance to the reorganization efforts.
16. Estoppel o=52.15
Elements which must be present for
the doctrine of equitable estoppel to apply
are: words or conduct by the party against
whom estoppel is alleged constituting either a misrepresentation or concealment of
material facts; knowledge on part of the
party against whom estoppel is alleged that
representations were untrue; party claiming benefit of estoppel must not have
known the representations to be false either at the time they were made or at the
time they were acted upon; party estopped
must either intend or expect that his conduct or representations will be acted upon
the party asserting the estoppel; party
seeking benefit of estoppel must have relied or acted upon the representations; and
party claiming benefit of the estoppel must
be in a position of prejudice if the other
party is permitted to deny the truth of the
representations which were made.
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17. Kstoppel e=>52.15
Proof of fraudulent intent is not always necessary to invoke the doctrine of
estoppel; although fraud is an essential
element, it is sufficient that a fraudulent or
unjust effect results from defendant's conduct.
18. Estoppel <e=>58
In the absence of any showing that
franchisee-tenant or trustee were prejudiced by franchisor-landlord's delay in advancing its argument that lease had been
terminated prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, franchisor-landlord wa$ not
estopped from making that argument even
though it had at one time filed a complaint
requesting the bankruptcy judge to compel
assumption or rejection of the agreements
in question.

James A. Chatz, Michael R. Hassan, Lord
Bissell & Brook, Chicago, 111., for plaintiff.
Charles J. Myler, G. Alexander McTavish, Ruddy, Myler, Ruddy & Fabian, Aurora, III., for defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MORAN, District Judge.
This is an appeal from a final order entered by the Bankruptcy Court denying
plaintiff-appellant's motion to lift the automatic stay. The opinion of the bankruptcy
judge is reported at 30 B.R. 982 (Bkrtcy.N.
D.111.1983). This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334. It is plaintiff-appellant's position that the stay should be lifted
because the sublease and franchise agreement between the parties, which covered a
Burger King restaurant, had been terminated prior to the date appellee-defendant
filed its Chapter 11 proceeding.
I.
Section 3G5(a) of the Bankruptcy Code,
11 U.S.C. § 365(a), permits the bankruptcy
trustee to "assume or reject any executory
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor."
The Co.dfi further provides that:
40 BR.—7

If there has been a default in an executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor, the trustee may not assume such
contract or lease unless, at the time of
the assumption of such contract or lease,
the trustee—
a) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly
cure, such default;
b) compensates, or provides adequate
assurance that the trustee will promptly compensate, a party other than the
debtor to such contract or lease, for
any actual pecuniary loss to such party
resulting from such default; and
c) provides adequate assurance of further performance under such contract
or lease.
11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1).
In its April 12, 1983 reorganization plan,
the trustee proposed to assume the sublease and franchise agreement. Chart
House, Inc. promptly challenged this
planned assumption, not on the ground that
the trustee's assurances were inadequate
under 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1) but, more fundamentally, because these agreements had
been terminated prior to bankruptcy and
thus were not subject to assumption under
11 U.S.C. § 365(a). See 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, J 365.02 at 365-13 (15th ed. 1983).
Chart House and Maxwell had entered
into a Burger King franchise agreement
and a sublease at the end of December
1979. The franchise agreement permitted
Maxwell to operate a Burger King restaurant at a specified location in Elgin, Illinois.
The sublease covered those premises.
The provisions for termination of each of
these agreements are of most importance
to this case. The applicable language in
the franchise agreement was as follows:
[XL] B. Should [Maxwell] suffer an
occurrence of any of the following
events, [Chart House], at its option and
without prejudice to any other rights or
remedies provided for hereunder, or by
law or equity, may terminate this license.
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(2) If franchisee defaults in the payment of royalties or advertising due
hereunder or fails to submit profit and
loss statements or other financial
statements . . . and fails to cure such
defaults within thirty (30) days of written notification to cure same.
*
*
*
*
*
*

quently, on May 7, 1982, Chart House sent
Maxwell a "Landlord's Five Days' Notice,"
which stated that unless Maxwell paid his
rent within five days its "lease of said
premises will be terminated forthwith."
The notice further demanded immediate
possession of the premises in the event of
non-payment.

(0) Upon notification of any default
[Maxwell] agrees to promptly take
such steps as may be required to cure
the default and shall diligently pursue
such curative measures as may be required and in the event that thirty (30)
days' time is insufficient then [Maxwell] shall have as much time as may
be reasonably required to cure same.
(Franchise Agreement, pp. 36a-37a.) (Emphasis added.)l
The sublease agreement provided in relevant part that:
If [Maxwell] shall fail to pay any installments of rent promptly on the day when
the same shall become due and payable
hereunder, and shall continue in default
for a period of thirty (30) days after,
written notice thereof by [Chart House]
. . . [Chart House] may (a) declare the
said term ended, and enter into said
premises demised, or any part thereof,
either with or without process of law,
and expel [Maxwell] . . . and so to repossess and enjoy said premises in [Chart
House's] former estate.
(Sublease Agreement, p. 58a.)

Maxwell did not pay his back rent or the
other monies he owed Chart House, offer a
repayment plan or relinquish possession of
the restaurant. On May 14, 1982, Chart
House brought an action in state court for
possession of the restaurant and for judgment in the amount of the rent arrearage.
This action was automatically stayed when
Maxwell filed a voluntary petition for relief
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
on May 21, 1982. Maxwell has continued
to occupy and operate the restaurant since
he declared bankruptcy. He has not cured
the defaults but has on occasion made rental, royalty and advertising payments. His
total indebtedness to Chart House has increased since he filed for bankruptcy.

Beginning in January of 1982, Maxwell
failed to make the required advertising and
royalty payments under the franchise
agreement, as well as rental payments under the sublease. On April 6, 1982, Chart
House sent a letter to Maxwell which called
attention to these defaults, demanded that
they be promptly cured, and promised that
Chart House would resort to all of its legal
remedies if Maxwell had not made payment
or offered a satisfactory arrangement for
payment within thirty days.
Maxwell neither cured the defaults nor
offered a repayment arrangement. ConseI.

Page numbers refer to the appendix lo Chart

II.
Initially it is necessary to clarify the relationship between the franchise agreement
and the sublease. The Bankruptcy Court
viewed the sublease and the franchise
agreement as both separate and interdependent, such that the agreements had to
be terminated simultaneously in order to
terminate either agreement. The court rejected Chart House's argument that the
sending of the five-day notice to Maxwell
and the filing of the forcible entry and
detainer action in state court terminated
the sublease and were together an affirmative act which terminated the franchise
agreement. This approach was in error.
Certainly the two agreements are closely
interdependent. The franchise agreement
is limited to the specific premises which are
the subject of the sublease. As Maxwell
points out, termination of the sublease
leaves the franchisee with a franchise that
is worthless because there is no place to
House's brief.
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operate it. In addition, the franchisee's
obligation to make royalty and advertising
payments is based upon the volume of its
sales. Clearly, termination of the sublease
means no sales by franchisee and thus renders the franchise agreement nugatory. In
light of this interdependence, Maxwell argues that so long as the franchise agreement is in effect, the continuing existence
of the sublease must be implied.
[1] A better view is that because of the
functional interdependence of these two
contracts, termination of the sublease
would also serve to terminate the franchise
agreement, assuming that the pretermination procedures for the franchise agreement had been followed. Here Chart
House followed these pretermination procedures. Its April 6 letter expressly advised
Maxwell of the default under the franchise
agreement. Maxwell neither cured the default nor made a diligent effort to do so
within thirty days.
[2] The bankruptcy judge was correct
in deciding that the franchise agreement
did not lapse automatically after these thirty days had elapsed. Rather, at the expiration of the thirty days Chart House could
terminate the franchise agreement "at its
option"' (Franchise Agreement XI-B).
Since the viability of the franchise agreement so obviously rested upon the continued existence of the sublease, Chart
House's five-day notice of the impending
termination of the sublease and its filing of
suit in state court clearly advised Maxwell
of Chart House's termination of the relationship between the parties.
[3] It is instructive that the franchise
agreement does not specify either the form
or the content of the affirmative act necessary to exercise the option of terminating
the agreement. Absent express contractual language, this court must adopt a reasonable construction of the termination
provision in the franchise agreement. A
requirement that Chart House could only
terminate the sublease or the franchise
agreement by simultaneous termination of
2.

Section 8 has been rccnactcd as III.Kc\.Slni.

both agreements, through the use of essentially duplicative notice procedures, exalts
form over substance and ignores the inevitable negation of the franchise agreement
occasioned by the termination of the sublease.
III.
The issue thus becomes whether the sublease had been terminated before Maxwell
filed for bankruptcy. If the sublease and
the franchise agreement are interdependent and their termination procedures are
interrelated, as outlined above, a finding
that the sublease had been terminated will
permit the lifting of the stay and prevent
the trustee from assuming the agreements.
Alternatively, if the two agreements are
independently terminable, a finding that
the sublease had been terminated will have
the same effect. If the stay is lifted on the
sublease alone and Chart House dispossesses Maxwell from the site, the franchise
agreement will be of no use to the trustee
for the reasons set out above.
The five-day notice which Chart House
sent to Maxwell conformed to the statutory
notice requirement:
[A] landlord or his agent may, at any
time after rent is due, demand payment
thereof and notify the tenant, in writing,
that unless payment is made within a
time mentioned in such notice, not less
than five days after service thereof, the
lease will be terminated. If the tenant
shall not within the time mentioned in
such notice, pay the rent due, the landlord may consider the lease ended and
sue for possession . . . .
Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 80, § 8 (repealed as of July
1, 1982) (emphasis added).2 When Maxwell
made no response to this notice Chart
House filed an action for possession and
back rent in state court. The court had yet
to enter judgment when the automatic stay
was imposed. Because the bankruptcy
judge believed that the sublease and the
franchise agreement were interrelated and
had to be terminated separately and simulth. 110, $ 9-209.

236

10 BANKRUPTCY KKPOUTKR

taneously, a finding that the sublease had
been terminated would have been of no
consequence to his decision not to lift the
stay since he had decided that the franchise
agreement remained in effect. He nevertheless held that in light of the absence of
a judgment on Chart House's suit for forcible entry and detainer, the sublease had
not been terminated for purposes of the
bankruptcy proceeding. The judge cited
with approval Executive Square Office
Building v. O'Connor & Associates, Inc.,
19 B.R. 143 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla.1981). That
court held that even leases terminated because of the tenant's default could be assumed by the bankruptcy trustee so long
as the tenant had declared bankruptcy prior to the conclusion of statutorily-prescribed judicial eviction proceedings for a
judgment of possession. Id. at 146-43.
[4] Putting aside for a moment the effect of bankruptcy proceedings, it is clear
under Illinois law that by sending the fiveday notice and by filing a suit for possession, Chart House terminated the sublease.
See Woods v. Soucy. 166 111. 407, 47 N.E.
67 (1897); Elizondo v. Medina, 100 111.
App.3d 718, 56 Ill.Dec. 301, 303, 427 N\E.2d
381, 383 (1st Dist.1981); Elizondo v. Perez,
42 Ill.App.3d 313, 1 Ill.Dec. 112, 113, 356
N.E.2d 112, 113 (1st Dist.1976); Westerman v. Gilmore, 17 Ill.App.2d 455, 150
N.E.2d 660, 662-63 (3d Dist.1958); Juhasz
v. Haisan, 337 Ill.App. 387, 85 N.E.2d 856
(1st Dist.1949); Stromberg v. Western
Telephone Co., $6 Ill.App. 270 (1899). Illinois courts have interpreted the clause in
Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 80, § 8, that "[i]f the tenant shall not within the time mentioned in
such notice, pay the rent due, the landlord
may consider the lease ended," to mean
what it says. Leases in Illinois are terminated five days after the tenant's receipt of
the statutory notice, provided the tenant
does not cure the default. Upon the expiration of the five-day notice Maxwell lost
its leasehold interest and became a tenant
at sufferance. This occurred by May 14,
1982, well before- Maxwell declared bankruptcy.

IV.
f5] It has been conclusively established
that a bankruptcy court cannot resurrect a
lease that has been terminated prior to the
filing of bankruptcy. In re Foxfire Inn of
Stuart Florida Inc., 30 B.R. 30, 31-32
(Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla.1983); Matter of DcPoy, 29
B.R. 466, 470 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ind.1983); In re
Pagoda International, Inc., 26 B.R. 18, 21
(Bkrtcy.D.Md.1982); In re Darwin, 22 B.R.
259, 263 (Bkrtcy.E.D.N.Y.1982); In re Fidelity American Mortgage Co., 19 B.R.
568, 573 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa.1982); In re Victory Pipe Craftsmen, Inc., 8 B.R. 635, 637
(Bkrtcy.N-D.Ill.19Sl) (Eisen, J.); Matter of
R.R.S., Inc., 7 B.R. S70, 872-73 (Bkrtcy.M.
D.Fla.1980); In re Aries Enterprises, Ltd.,
3 B.R. 472, 475-76 (Bkrtcy.D.C.1980). See
also Matter of Commodity
Merchants,
Inc., 53S F.2d 1260, 1262 (7th Cir.1976)
(Section 70(b) of Bankruptcy Act); cf. Matter of Sew Media Irjax, Inc., 19 B.R. 199,
200-01 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla.1982) (contract for
goods). Leases terminated before bankruptcy are simply not assumable by the
trustee.
' The bankruptcy judge here, relying on
Executive Square, supra, nevertheless
treated the sublease as "property of the
estate" subject to the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2) and (3) and
assumable by the trustee. What was decisive for the judge, as for the court in
Executive Square, was that the state court
had not rendered judgment on Chart
House's forcible entry and detainer action.
The judge reasoned that since this proceeding offered Maxwell an opportunity to resort to equity in order to prevent termination of the lease, the lease had not expired
for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 365(a). This
was in error.
[6] In some states it is necessary for
the landlord to obtain a judgment for possession in order to terminate a lease. See
e.g., In re Fontaineblcau Hotel Corp., 515
F.2d 913 (5th Cir.1975) (Louisiana law).
The bankruptcy judge offered no support
for the proposition that Illinois is one of
these states and this court has found no
such support. In Illinois the statutory no-

IN RK M.VXWKLL

237

Cite a% 40 U.K. 2.31 (DC. I9M)

tice procedure for terminating a lease and
a forcible entry and detainer action are two
distinct things. The former process ends
the contractual relationship between the
parties while the forcible entry and detainer action determines rights to possession of
property. The bankruptcy court confused
the two actions. Executive Square has
been persuasively criticized on the same
ground. See In re Foxfire Inn of Stuart
Florida, Inc., supra, 30 B.R. at 31 (Executive Squai'e "confused expiration or termination of lease with physical repossession
of the leased premises"). The conclusion
of the Foxfire court is equally applicable to
this case:
[T]he termination before bankruptcy of a
lease pursuant to its terms and applicable State law results in its expiration,
even if, as is the case here, the tenant
remains in possession as a tenant at sufferance and the landlord has instituted
but not yet concluded an eviction proceeding.
Id. at 31.

[7] The property of a bankrupt's estate
consists of "all legal or equitable interests
of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case."
11 U.S.
§ 541(a)(1). Courts have recognized that a
debtor-tenant in possession does have a
slight equitable interest under § 541 which
is protected by the automatic stay. See In
re Darwin, supra, 22 B.R. at 264-65; Matter of Ruby's Florida, 11 B.R. 171, 174-75
(Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla.1981); In re GSVC Restaurant Corp., 10 B.R. 300, 302 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Matter of R.R.S. Inc., supra, 7 B.R.
at 872-83 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla.1980); In re Andorra Meat Market, Inc., 7 B.R. 744, 74546 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa.1980); In re Mimi's of
Atlanta, Inc., 5 B.R. 623, 627 (Bkrtcy.N.D.
Ga.1980), affd, 11 B.R. 710 (D.C.N.D.Ga.
1981). The automatic stay gives only limited and temporary protection to this equitable interest. It will be lifted "for cause" in
light of the debtor's inability to satisfy the
requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), In re
Darwin, supra, 22 B.R., at 264-65 (Bkrtcy.
E.D.N.Y.1982), In re Andorra Meat Mar-

kct, Inc., supra. 7 B.R. at 746, or when the
debtor can show no basis in equity for its
continuance, In re Foxfire Inn of Stuart
Florida, Inc., supra, 30 B.R. at 31-32.
[8] As a debtor in possession, under a
terminated lease which left it with only a
tenancy at sufferance, Maxwell held this
limited equitable interest which was protected by the automatic stay. It is not
necessary to the disposition of this case to
determine whether this interest has since
lapsed or whether the automatic stay could
have been lifted for cause under 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(d). Nevertheless, the court notes
that for many months after he declared
bankruptcy Maxwell apparently had made
little or no effort to prepare a plan to pay
off his debts and the amount of his debt to
Chart House rose during the post-bankruptcy period.
[9] What is crucial to the outcome of
this case is that the presence of a limited
equitable interest held by a debtor in possession has no bearing whatsoever on the
issue of the assumability of the terminated
lease. "The fact that the automatic stay
gives limited and temporary protection to a
holdover tenant-debtor, based solely on
naked possession, does not mean that there
is a viable executory contract which a debtor can assume under Sec. 363 of the Bankruptcy Code." Matter of R.R.S. Inc., supra, 7 B.R. at 872. See also In re Foxfire
Inn, supra; In re Darwin, supra; Matter
of Ruby's Florida, supra; In re Andorra
Meat Market, supra. The use of the automatic stay to protect the limited interest of
the tenant in possession has absolutely no
bearing on the continued viability of the
lease. "Once a lease is terminated prior to
the intervention of bankruptcy, the landlord-tenant relationship is gone regardless
of the protection of the right of possession." Matter of R.R.S., supra, 7 B.R. at
873. The separateness of the questions of
the assumability of the lease and of the
existence of a limited equitable interest
based on the debtor's continued possession
of property mirrors the differences between the process for terminating a lease
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it did make to Chait House related to its
continued occupation <\nd operation of the
A landlord's acceptance of
[10] The I ele\ ance of these pi inciplc& to lestauiant
lent
MK\
other
payments from a tenant at
the case at hand is cleai E\en if Maxwell
sufferance
does
not reu\e a terminated
has oi had some piotectihle equitable intei
lease
It
is
well
established that liability
est stemming from his continued occupa
for
rent
continues
so long as the tenant is
tion of the testauiant premises, this intei
in
possession
Jack
Spang, Inc v Little,
est is not suificient to ie\i\e the teiminat
ed sublease Because Chait House had 50 III 2d 351, 280 N E 2d 208, 213 (1972)
pioperlv teiminated the sublease pnor to Consequently, by accepting these pa* ments
Maxwell's declaiation of bankiuptc\ the Chait House did not wai\e its termination
of the sublease
sublease cannot be assumed In the tiustee
and the adjudication of possesMnv lights in
i wrongful entiy and detainer action

\I
The bankrupts judge identified two eq
uitable factois in suppoit of his conclusion
The iirst is that Chait House waited foi
almost a \ear to assert that the sublease
and the fianchise agieements had been tei
mmated and should therebv be estopped
fiom making thu> aigument The second
factoi that he identified is that the two
agieements aie Maxwell's onh assets and
neces:>aul\ bene as the basis of the tius
tee s reoiganization plan On appeal, Max
well ad\ances a thud equitable factoi
w Inch it argues should prompt the com t to
find that the two agreements aie assuma
ble, namely, that Maxwell has paid and
Chait House has accepted payments for
Maxwell's continued operation of the restaurant since it declared bankruptcy
[11-11] A landlord can waive termination of a lease by accepting the entue
amount of the default Bismarck Hotel
Co i Sutherland, 92 III App 3d 167, 47
111 Dec 512, 516, 415 N E 2d 517, 521 (1st
Dist 1980) \ par t i J cure of the default by
the tenant, e\en before the expiration of
the fi\e-day notice, is not sufficient to
avoid termination See Chapman v Woolsey, 4 111 App 2d 261, 124 N E 2d 366, 368
(4th Dist 1955), see also Elizondo v Medina, 100 111 App 3d 718, 56 111 Dec 301, 302,
427 N E 2d 3S1, 382 (1st Dist 1981), LehndotffUSA
Ltd v Cousins Club, Inc, 40
111 App 3d 875, 353 N E 2d 171, 175-76 (1st
Dist 197b) Here it is undisputed that Maxwell has ne\ei £\en partialh cured the
defaults which prompted Chait House's
termination effoits The pa>ments which

[15] The bankruptcy judge s reliance on
the importance of the sublease and the
franchise agreement to the reorganization,
is misplaced Courts will not revive a ter
mmated lease simply because of the lease s
importance to the reorganization efforts
The statement of the court in In ye Fidcli
ty Mortgage Company, supra, is t>pical
The trustee contends, however, that we
should consider the equities of the instant case—namelv, that the property in
question is important to the successful
reorganization of the debtors—and thus
deny the lehef requested b> the bank
Although such considerations are impor
tant in determining whether relief from
the automatic stay should be granted, we
conclude that they are irrelevant in determining whether the debtors have an\
interest in the property so that the protection of the automatic stay is available
Where the debtor has lost all interest in
the property prior to the filing of a petition under the Code, we conclude that we
should not rely on equitable considera
tions to revive the debtor's interest and
to make the automatic stay provisions
applicable
19 B R at 573 (footnote omitted) See also
Matte? of DePoy, supra, 29 BR. at 470,
In ?e Damin, sup?a9 22 B R at 263, In le
Victoiy Pipe Craftsmen, Inc, supra, 8
BR at 637, In ie Chuck Wagon Bar-BQue Inc, 7 B R 92, 95 (Bkrtcy D C 1980)
The bankruptcy judge's position that
Chart House is equitably estopped from
asserting that the agreements were terminated is peihaps the strongest of the three
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factors identified. After its suit for possession of the premises was stayed, Chart
House filed a complaint requesting the
bankruptcy judge to compel assumption or
rejection of the agreements in question. In
apparent reliance upon Chart House's failure to assert that the agreements were
terminated, the trustee devised a reorganization plan. It is only after the trustee
filed his plan, which called for the sale of
the business rather than its return to Chart
House, that Chart House amended its complaint to assert that the agreements had
been terminated prior to bankruptcy.
[16] Equitable estoppel is defined as
"the effect of voluntary conduct of a party
whereby he is precluded from asserting
rights which might otherwise have existed
against another party who has, in good
faith, relied upon such conduct and has
been led thereby to change his position for
the worse." Gary-Whcaton Bank v. Burt.
104 Ill.App.3d 767, 60 Ill.Dec. 518, 527, 433
N.E.2d 315, 324 (2d Dist.l9S2). As stated
in Stewart v. O'Bnjan, 50 Ill.App.3d 108, S
Ill.Dec. 633, 365 N.E.2d 1019 (4th Dist.
1977). the six elements which must be
present for the doctrine of equitable estoppel to apply are:
(1) words or conduct by the party
against whom estoppel is alleged constituting either a misrepresentation or concealment of material facts; (2) knowledge on the part of the party against
whom the estoppel is alleged that representations made were untrue; (3) the
party claiming the benefit of the estoppel
must have not known the representations
to be false either at the time they were
made or at the time they were acted
upon; (4) the party estopped must either
intend or expect that his conduct or representations will be acted upon by the
party asserting the estoppel; (5) the party seeking the benefit of the estoppel
must have relied or acted upon the representations; and (6) the party claiming the
benefit of the estoppel must be in a position of prejudice if the party against
'whom the estoppel is alleged is permitted

to deny the truth of the representations
made.
S Ill.Dec. at 634-35, id. at 1020-21.
[17] Proof of fraudulent intent is not
always necessary to invoke the estoppel
doctrine. Although fraud is an essential
element, it is sufficient that a fraudulent or
unjust effect results from the defendant's
conduct. Cessna v. Montgomery, 63 111.2d
71, SG, 344 N.E.2d 447, 454 (1976). Whether estoppel should be applied in a given
case must be determined from the particular circumstances. Tyska by Tyska v.
Board of Education, 117 Ul.App.3d 917, 73
Ill.Dec. 209, 221, 453 N.E.2d 1344, 1356 (1st
Dist.1983).
[IS] The elements necessary for equitable estoppel are not present here. There is
no indication that Chart House's failure to
actively pursue from the start its claim
that the agreements were terminated, or
any representations it made to the trustee,
were designed to mislead or defraud Maxwell or the trustee. Nothing prevented the
trustee from concluding—as was evident
under Illinois law—that at a minimum the
sublease had been validly terminated.
More fundamentally, there is no proof that
either Maxwell or the trustee were prejudiced by Chart House's delay in advancing
its termination argument. Whether or not
the agreements are assumed by the trustee
appears to be of little concern to Maxwell.
He will lose the restaurant in any event.
The trustee admittedly will not see his reorganization plan come to fruition. This does
not amount to legally-cognizable prejudice
or detriment sufficient to invoke the estoppel doctrine, especially where other requisites are absent, or sufficient to resurrect
the terminated agreements directly.
It appears from the limited record that
Chart House has throughout these proceedings sought to regain possession of the
restaurant. While its failure to promptly
argue that the sublease and the franchise
agreement had been terminated before
bankruptcy, appears, in retrospect, to have
been an unfortunate choice of legal tactics,
no "fraudulent or unjust effect," Cessna,
supra, 344 N.E.2d 447, at 454, has resulted
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from its conduct. Consequently, in the absence of any other compelling equitable
factors, Chart House is not precluded from
asserting that the agreements were terminated.
Conclusion

The franchise agreement and the sublease should have been read together such
that the termination of the sublease would
effectively terminate the franchise agreement. Chart House had terminated the
sublease prior to Maxwell filing his Chapter 11 petition. Xo equitable factors justify resurrecting the sublease or precluding
Chart House from arguing that the franchise agreement and sublease had been terminated. Consequently, the lease and the
franchise agreement are not assumable by
the trustee and the bankruptcy court
should have lifted the automatic stay.
The decision of the bankruptcy court is
reversed. This case is remanded to that
court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

In re Jorge L. Cebollero SANTINI and
Marta T. Martir Cruz (a/k/a Marta
Luisa) d/b/a Super Muebieria Cebollero, Debtors-Appellants.
Civ. No. S3-1229CC.
United States District Court,
D. Puerto Rico.
May 11, 1984.
On appeal from a bankruptcy court
court order denying motion to alter, amend
or reconsider order denying request for
extraordinary remedy, the District Court,
Cerezo, J., held that although bankruptcy
court perhaps haxLpower to issue requested
stay of foreclosure proceedings, no valid

reasons were shown to reverse prior decision denying relief, and practical effect of
granting relief sought would have been to
set aside judgment which was final and
correctly decided, and where foreclosure
judgment was executed and debtors failed
to appeal such judgment, granting of extraordinary request would be futile.
Appeai dismissed.
1. Federal Civil Procedure <£=2647
Although movant's choice of words for
title of motion would appear to place it
under rule authorizing the opening of judgment on motion for new trial and direction
of entry of new judgment, same could not
properly be considered as such where it
sought reconsideration of order, and not of
judgment, and where there had been no
judgment entered regarding order sought
to be reconsidered. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.
Rules 59, 60, 28 U.S.C.A.
2. Federal Courts C=*657, 763
Rule authorizing motion for relief from
final judgment does not interrupt period to
appeal order or judgment from which relief
is sought, and appeal from order denying
such motion calls for review only of order
of denial itself, and not of the underlying
judgment. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 60, 28
U.S.C.A.
3. Federal Civil Procedure <£=2647
Rule authorizing relief from final judgment is not substitute for appeal, and motions based on it that seek only to attack
allegedly erroneous judgment that was not
appealed are generally disfavored. Fed.
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 60(b), 28 U.S.C.A.
4. Bankruptcy <s=217.2
Although bankruptcy court perhaps
had power to issue requested stay of foreclosure proceedings, no valid reasons were
shown to reverse decision denying such
relief, and practical effect of granting relief sought would have been to set aside
judgment which was final and correctly
decided, and where foreclosure judgment
was executed and debtors failed to appeal
such judgment, granting of extraordinary

J. vfici
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DOUGLAS G. MORTENSEN, #2329
MATHESON, JEPPSON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
648 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 363-2244

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING CENTER,
LTD., a Utah Limited Partnership
Plaintiff,

)

vs.

'

SYDNEY SEFTEL AND MIKE LANDES,
aka MICHAEL S. LANDES,

]

Defendants.

'

JUDGMENT

Civil No. C85-7 821

(Judge John A. Rokich)

This case came on for trial on February 9th and 10th, 1989.
Planitiff

was

present

Skankey,

and

was

Mortensen.

through

its general

represented

by

its

partner, Richard
counsel,

Douglas

S.
G.

Defendant Sydney Seftel was not present, having filed

bankruptcy during

the pendency of

this action prior to trial.

Defendant Michael S. Landes was also absent, but was represented
by his counsel, Daniel W. Jackson.

The Court heard the testimony

of witnesses, admitted documentary evidence, heard and considered
oral argument and took the matter under advisement.
of

the

evidence

arguments

and

submitted

all

of

herein,

the
and

memoranda

and

further based

Based on all
other

on

the

written
Court's

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law heretofore entered herein,
and good cause appearing:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
Plaintiff Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. be and the same
is hereby
Michael

awarded

S. Landes,

Judgment
in

against Defendant

the principal

amount

Mike Landes, aka
of

$15,000.00

for

restoration damages, together with interest thereon at the rate of
ten percent per annum from June 7, 19 86, amounting to $4, 37 5.^0 0;
$75,000.00 for loss of rental damages, together with interest at
the rate of ten percent per annum on accruing $3,126.16 per month
portions thereof from June 7, 19 85 through June 1, 19 87, amounting
to £22,815.00; plus attorneys fees in the amount of $16,667.00,
plus costs in the amount of $782.51, as set forth in Plaintiff! s
Attorney's Fee Affidavit

(Exhibit P-31), for a total Judgment in

the amount of $134,639.51, which judgment shall bear interest from
the date hereof at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per. annum.
Dated this

N

.,' day of May, 19 89.
By the Court:

John' A. Rokich
District Court Judge
Approved as to Form:

Daniel W. Jackson
Attorney for Defendant Michael S. Landes
-2-
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DOUGLAS G. MORTENSEN, #2329
MATHESON, JEPPSON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
648 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 363-2244
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING CENTER,
LTD., a Utah Limited Partnership
)
)

Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

Civil No. C85-7 821

SYDNEY SEFTEL AND MIKE LANDES, aka '
MICHAEL S. LANDES,
]
(Judge John A. Rokich)
A

Defendants.

This case came on for trial on February 9th and 10thf
Planiuiff

was present

Skankey,

and

Morter.sen.
bankruptcy

was

through

its general

represented

by

its

partner,
counsel,

19 89.

Richard
Douglas

S.
G.

Defendant Sydney Seftel was not present, having filed
during

Defendant Michael

the pendency

of

this

action

prior

to trial.

S. Landes was also absent, but was represented

by his counsel, Daniel W. Jackson.

The Court heard the testimony

of witnesses, admitted documentary evidence, heard and considered
oral

argument

and

took

the

matter

under

advisement.

Having

considered all of the evidence and all of the memoranda and other

written

submissions,

and

good

cause

appearing,

the

Court

now

enters its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Several months prior to trial, Defendant Landes filed a

Motion for Summary Judgment.
a Motion
these

for

Partial

motions

Summary Judgment.

were

intensively

and

The

issues presented by

extensively

briefed

and

On November 14, 19 88, this Court denied Cefendant Landes1

argued.
Motion

Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed

for

Summary

Judgment

and

granted

Plaintiff's

Motion

for

Partial Summary Judgment, expressly finding Defendant Landes to be
a guarantor of the obligations of Bagel Nosh Holding Corp. under
the

December

premises

in

29,
the

197 8

Lease

Olympus

Hills

Agreement
Shopping

Wasatch Boulevard, Holladay, Utah.
would

be

Landes'

limited

to

liability

for

the

covering
Center

the

subject

located

at

3923

The Court ruled that the trial

question

of

the

amount

of

Defendant

rent and other charges accruing under

the

Bagel Nosh Lease.
2.

Plaintiff

and

Bagel

Nosh

Holding

Corp. entered

into a

Lease Agreement for a twenty year term on December 29, 197 8.
3.

On July 15, 1981, Plaintiff and Bagel Nosh Holding Corp.

executed

a

document

entitled

First

Amendment

document provided for a guarantee of the Lease.

to

Lease.

This

Defendants Seftel

and Landes executed the First Amendment to Lease as guarantors of
the Lease, as amended.
Defendants

Seftel

and

In signing the First Amendment to Lease,
Landes personally
-2-

guaranteed

the

terms of

the

amended

Lease.

The

separate

"guarantee11

Amendment

to Lease.

set

First

Amendment

forth

Neither

as

the

to

Lease
"C!!

Exhibit

Plaintiff

refers
to

to

the

a

First

nor Defendant

Landes

was able to produce the "Exhibit CIS at trial.
4.

Plaintiff

initiated

legal

action

against

Defendants

Landes and Seftel in 19 84 and obtained judgments against them in
the sums of

$30,710.70 and $5,457.93, respectively, for past-due

rent and other sums due.
5.

That action was Case No. C84-4255.

The judgments entered

in C84-4255 were satisfied by the

Defendants.
6.

The Defendants did not take an appeal from either of the

judgments entered in C84-4255.
that

those

judgments

were

They later contended in this case

non-appealable

because

all

claims

against all of the parties were not adjudicated in Case No. C844255.
7.

This Court found that the Defendants precluded themselves

from taking an appeal from said judgments by paying and satisfying
such judgments and not ever raising the appealability issue until
this proceeding.
8.

Bagel

Nosh

Intermountain,

Ltd.

filed

for

relief

under

as Bagel

Nosh

Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court.
9.

The bankrupt

company

was

doing business

Olympus Hills.
10.

The exact date that Bagel Nosh vacated the Olympus Hills

premises is unknown.
-3-

11.

The

tenant, Bagel

Nosh, discontinued

doing business

in

the leased premises, but allowed items of its personal property to
remain

in and

upon

the premises

for

some

time after

it ceased

actively conducting business there.
12.

Plaintiff re-entered the leased premises in June of 1986

for the purpose of attempting to relet the premises.
13.

The premises were not restored to the original condition,

reasonable wear and tear excepted.
14.

Plaintiff attempted to relet the premises, but refused to

relet for a short term or to a "mom and pop" operation.
15.

Plaintiff

had opportunities

to lease the premises for a

short term such as three years to a "mom and pop" operation, but
the prospective

"mom

and

pop"

tenants

did

not meet

Plaintiff's

criteria.
16.

The

Lease

Agreement

provides

for

attorneys

fees

to be

awarded to the successful party in an action filed in relation to
the Lease.
17.

The

Court,

despite

its

previous

ruling

not

to

allow

Defendant to raise defenses which were or could have been raised
in Case No C84-4255, did allow Defendants to raise certain of such
defenses and present evidence in support thereof.
18.

The

Plaintiff

is

entitled

to

$15,000

for

damages

to

restore the premises, together with interest thereon at the rate
of ten percent per annum from June 7, 1986.

-4-

19.
rentals

Plaintiff

is entitled to $75,000 in damages for loss of

from June 7, 1985

through June 7, 1987

at the rate of

$3,126.16 per month, together with interest on the accruing amount
thereof

at

the

rate

of

ten

percent

per

annum.

The

total

prejudgment interest on this element of damage through May, 19 89
is $22,815.00.
20.

Plaintiff

is

entitled

to

attorneys

fees

of

$16,667,

together with its costs incurred in this action.
Based

upon

the

foregoing

findings

of

fact,

the

Court

now

enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Plaintiff had a valid and existing Lease with Bagel Nosh

Holding Corp.
2.

Defendant

Landes

and

Seftel

guaranteed

the

Tenant's

performance of the terms and conditions of the Lease.
3.

Neither

proceeding
Olympus

by

the

Bagel

Hills, nor

filing
Nosh

Bagel

of

the

Intermountain,
Nosh's

Chapter

11

Ltd.,

dba

subsequent

Bankruptcy
Bagel

"rejection"

of

Nosh
the

Lease terminated the Lease.
4.

The Bagel Nosh bankruptcy proceedings did not affect the

obligations of the non-bankrupt guarantor or guarantors.
5.

The Plaintiff did not use its best efforts to relet the

premises.

-5-

6.

The

Plaintiff

is

entitled

to

$15,000

for

damages

to

restore the premises, together with interest thereon at the rate
of ten percent per annum from June 7, 19 86.
7.
rentals

Plaintiff

is entitled to $75,000 in damages for loss of

from June 7,

1985

through June 7,

1987 at the rate of

$3,126.16 per month, together with interest on the accruing amount
thereof

at

the

rate

of

ten

percent

per

annum.

The

total

prejudgment interest on this element of dair.age through May, 1989
is $22,815.00
8.

Plaintiff

is

entitled

to

attorneys

fees

together with its costs incurred in this action.
Dated this

^ ^

day of May, 1989.
By the Court:

John A. Rokich
District Court Judge

Approved as to Form:

Daniel W. Jackson
Attorney for Defendant Michael S. Landes
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING CENTER,
LTD., a Utah Limited
Partnership,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO.

C-85-7821

Plaintiff,
vs.
SIDNEY SEFTEL and MIKE LANDES,
aka MICHAEL S. LANDES,
Defendants.

This case came on for trial on February 9, 1989.

Plaintiff

was present and represented by Douglas G. Mortensen.

Defendant

was not present, but represented by Daniel W. Jackson.

The Court

heard the testimony of witnesses, admitted documentary evidence,
heard oral argument, and took the matter under advisement.
The Court having reviewed its notes and the Memoranda filed,
now enters its ruling.
The Court finds as follows:
1.

Plaintiff and Bagel Nosh Holding Corp. entered into a

lease agreement for a 20 year term on the 29th day of December,
1978.
2.

On July

15, 1981, plaintiff and Bagel Nosh Holding

Corp. executed a document entitled First Amendment to Lease.

OLYMPUS V. SEFTEL

3.

The

First

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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Amendment

to

Lease

also

provided

for a

guarantee of the lease.
4.

The defendants Sidney Seftel and Mike Landes executed

the First Amendment to the Lease agreement as guarantors.
5.

Defendants

personally

guaranteed

the

terms

of

the

amended lease, the terms of which guarantee are set forth in
Exhibit C which was made part of the First Amendment to the
Lease.
6.

Plaintiff

nor

defendant

were

able

to

produce

the

against

the

original or copy of Exhibit C at the time of trial.
7.

That plaintiffs

initiated

legal

action

defendants in 1984 and obtained Judgments against the defendants
in the sums of $30,710.70 and $5,457.93 for past due rent - Case
No. C-84-4255.
8.

The defendants satisfied the Judgments.

9.

The defendants

did not take an

appeal

from either

Judgment, but contended that the Judgments were non-appealable
because

all

claims

against

all

of

the

parties

were

not

adjudicated in Case No. C-84-4255.
10.

The

Court

found

that

the

defendants

precluded

themselves from taking an appeal from said Judgments because they
satisfied the same and did not ever raise the issue until these
proceedings.

OLYMPUS V, SEFTEL

11.
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Bagel Nosh Intermountain Ltd. filed for relief under

Chapter 11 of the U. S. Bankruptcy Court.
12.

The bankrupt company was doing business as Bagel Nosh

Olympus Hills.
13.

The exact date that Bagel Nosh vacated the premises is

unknown.
14.

The tenant Bagel Nosh discontinued doing business in

the leased premises, but allowed items of its personal property
to remain in and upon the premises.
15.

Plaintiff re-entered the leased premises in June of

1986 for the purpose of attempting to relet the premises.
16.

The lease premises were not restored to the original

condition, reasonable wear and tear excepted.
17.

Plaintiff attempted to relet the premises, but refused

to relet for a short term or to a "morn and pop" operation.
18.

Plaintiff did have opportunities to lease the premises

for three years to a "mom and pop" operation, but these tenants
did not meet plaintiff's criteria.
19.

The lease agreement provided for attorney fees to be

awarded to the successful

party if an action were filed in

relation to the lease.
20.

The Court, despite its previous rulings not to allow

defendant to raise certain defenses to this action, did allow

OLYMPUS V. SEFTEL
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defendants to raise the defenses and present evidence in support
thereof.

CONCLUSIONS
!•

Plaintiff had a valid and existing lease with Bagel

Nosh Holding Corp.
2.

Defendants guaranteed the terms and conditions of the

lease.
3.

The filing of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding by

Bagel Nosh Intermountain Ltd., dba Bagel Nosh Olympus Hills did
not terminate the lease.
4.

The

bankruptcy

proceedings

did

not

affect

the

obligations of the non-bankrupt guarantors, defendants.
5.

The plaintiff did not use its best efforts to relet the

premises.
6.

The plaintiff is entitled to $15,000.00 for damages to

restore the premises, and interest from June 7, 1986.
7.

The plaintiff is entitled to $75,000.00 damages for

loss of rentals, together with interest from June 7, 198 6.
8.

Plaintiff

is

awarded

$16,667.00

as

attorney

fees,

together with its costs.
9.

Plaintiff's counsel shall prepare Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, and a Judgment in accordance with this

OLYMPUS V. SEFTEL
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Memorandum Decision.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

This Memorandum does not purport to cover

all of the findings that could be made in this case.
Dated this

-3 7

day of March, 1989.
/
/

JOHN A. ROKICH
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

OLYMPUS V. SEFTEL
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the

foregoing

following, this

Memorandum
zI

Decision,

postage

day of March, 1989:

Douglas G. Mortensen
Attorney for Plaintiff
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Daniel W. Jackson
Attorney for Defendants
175 S. Main, Suite 560
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

prepaid,

to

the

NOV 11 uS3

DOUGLAS G. MORTENSEN #2329
MATHESON, JEPPSON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
648 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 363-2244
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING CENTER, LTD. , )
)
a Utah Limited Partnership,
1
)
Plaintiff,
1
vs.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT
LANDES* MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO STRI
AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

SIDNEY SEFTEL and MIKE LANDES,
aka MICHAEL S. LANDES,

Civil No. C85-7821
(Judge John A. Rokich)

Defendants.

Defendant

Mike

Landes'

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

and

Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment came on regularly
for hearing before the Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge of the
above-entitled Court on Monday, September 19, 1988 at 2:30 P.M.
Douglas G. Mortensen

appeared

Hills Shopping Center, Ltd.

on behalf of Plaintiff Olympus

Daniel W. Jackson appeared on behalf

of Defendant Mike Landes, aka Michael S. Landes.

The Court read

and considered the memoranda, exhibits and affidavits submitted
on behalf of the litigants and heard the arguments of counsel.
The Court also read Defendant Landes1 Motion to Strike and heard
argument concerning

it.

motions,

requested

the

Court

After

full argument on

further

briefing.

the pending
Thereafter,

post-hearing memoranda, letters and Court opinions were submitted
to the Court.

Based on the Court's careful consideration of all

such submissions and good cause appearing:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

Defendant Landes1 Motion to Strike is denied;

2.

Defendant Landes' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied;

3.

Plaintiff Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment is hereby granted;
4.

Defendant Landes is hereby barred from asserting at

trial any defenses or counterclaims he asserted or could have
asserted in Case No. C84-4355.

This Court hereby rules that

Defendant Landes is a guarantor of the obligations of Bagel Nosh
Holding
covering

Corp.

under

the subject

the December
premises

29, 1978 Lease

in the Olympus

Hills

Agreement
Shopping

Center located at 3923 Wasatch Boulevard, Holladay, Utah.

The

trial in this case shall be limited to the question of the amount
of

Defendant

Landes'

liability

for rent

and other

charges

accruing under the Bagel Nosh Lease.
Dated this /

u

day of &±U*te±z£, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

John \A. Rokich, Distribt Court Judge
Approved as to form:

Daniel W. Jackson
Attorney for Defendant, Landes
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
On the 17th day of October, 1988, I caused to be hand
delivered a true and accurate copy of the foregoing to:
Daniel W. Jackson
in Judge Rokich's Courtroom
nr:M77/i-r
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING CENTER,
LTD., a Utah Limited
Partnership,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO.

C-85-7821

Plaintiff,
vs.
SIDNEY SEFTEL and MIKE LANDES,
aka MICHAEL S. LANDES,
Defendants.

Defendants Michael Landes' Motion for Summary Judgment was
heard by the Court on the

/J

7

day of

^Lpk>* *>&,,' , 1988.

The

Court heard oral argument, reviewed the Memoranda filed and took
the matter under advisement.

Subsequent to taking the matter

under advisement counsel submitted

supplemental Memoranda and

pertinent cases for the Court's review.

The Court having read

the supplemental Memoranda and the pertinent cases cited, met
with counsel in chambers and advised counsel of its oral ruling
denying defendant Landes1 Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Court

advised counsel that it would prepare a brief written memorandum
decision.
The issue presented to the Court in this case is:

OLYMPUS V, SEFTEL
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Did a Judgment entered

in a prior action between these

parties bar defendant Landes from contesting liability in this
action as a guarantor because the doctrine of res ajudicata or
collateral estoppel applied.
It is defendant Landes1 contention that res ajudicata nor
collateral estoppel is applicable because a final judgment was
not entered in a prior action against Bagel Nosh are of the other
defendants
defendant

in

the

Landes1

prior

case.

However,

notwithstanding,

claim that the Judgment was not final for

appeal purposes proceeded to satisfy the Judgment entered against
defendant Landes.
The

Court

can

not

envision

any

greater

finality

of a

Judgment than a party foregoing its right to appeal pursuant to
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and paying the Judgment in
full.

When defendant Landes satisfied the Judgment, he gave up

his right to appeal and the satisfaction of the Judgment in the
prior

action

now

precludes

defendant

Landes

from

asserting

defenses to this action because the defenses are barred by the
doctrine of res adjudicata and collateral estoppel.

OLYMPUS V. SEFTEL
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiffs' Memoranda and post hearing Memoranda are adopted
by this Court in support of its ruling and refers counsel to said
Memorandum for the reasons for the Court's ruling.
Dated this

,^ O

day of January, 1989.

^-Jr 0-jC

A/' -J^^HLC^J1^

JOHN, A. ROKICH
D'ISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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OLYMPUS V. SEFTEL

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the

foregoing

following, this

Memorandum
-^ -

Decision,

postage

day of January, 1989:

Douglas G. Mortensen
Attorney for Plaintiff
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Daniel W. Jackson
Attorney for Defendants
175 S. Main, Suite 560
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

^^•^l'^H'C^Z>c

prepaid,

to

the

County of Salt Lake - State of Utah
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Plaintiff

CASE NO:
S-'s-t

,

-

V.

/V

>

'•

Defendant

Type of hearing: Div._
Present: Plif.
f
P.Atty:
'-tJwy
D. Atty:
/C^TZ,.. * "
Sworn & Examined:
Pltf:
Others:

Other.
Supp. Order.
OSC.
Stipulation.
Summons.
Publication.
Waiver
• Default of Pltf/Deft Entered
Date:
*?-/<?- r ?
Judge: .
*• K'rA>^i«
Clerk:
^i. ^7. ]^*e-w
v/
/C- <J.
Reporter:
Bailiff: _
i^ / L ^ i/^ -

Annul.
Deft..
, J5L£j4s2*srv\.

tX

v/

Jsrl-jj"'

^

Deft:

ORDERS:
D
•

Custody Evaluation Ordered
Visitation Rights

•
D
•

Pltf/Deft Awarded Support $
x
Pltf/Deft Awarded Alimony $
Payments to be made through the Clerk's Office:

•
•

Atty. fees to the.
Home To:

•

Custody Awarded To

=
Per Month/Year

•

Per Month
Alimony Waived

in the amount of

•

Deferred

•
Furnishings To:
. Automobile To:
13 Each Party Awarded their Personal Property
3
Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Debts and Obligations
3 Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Insurance on Minor Children
3 Restraining Order Entered Against.
3 Pltf/Deft. Granted Judgment for Arrearage in the Sum of $.
3 90-Day Waiting Period is Waived
"2 Divorce Granted To
As
• 3-Month Interlocutory
j
Decree To Become Final: • Upon Entry
3 Former Name of

. Is Restored

3

Based on the failure of Deft to appear in response to an order of the court and on motion of PItfs counsel, court
orders
/
shall issue for Deft
Returnable
. Bail.

3

Based on written stipulation of respective counselfrnotion of Plaintiff's counsel, and good cause appearing therefor,
court orders the above case be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice.
Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, court orders
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